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Investigations into past accidents at nuclear power generating facilities such as that of 
Three Mile Island have identified human factors as one of the foremost critical aspects in 
plant safety. Errors resulting from limitations in human information processing are of 
particular concern for human-machine interfaces (HMI) in plant control rooms. This 
project examines the application of Ecological Interface Design (EID) in HMI 
information displays and the effects on operator situation awareness (SA) for turbine 
secondary systems based on the Swedish Forsmark 3 boiling-water reactor nuclear power 
plant. A work domain analysis was performed on the turbine secondary systems yielding 
part-whole decomposition and abstraction hierarchy models. Information display 
requirements were subsequently extracted from the models. The resulting EID 
information displays were implemented in a full-scope simulator and evaluated with six 
licensed operating crews from the Forsmark 3 plant. Three measures were used to 
examine SA: self-rated bias, Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE), and Situation 
Awareness Control Room Inventory (SACRI). The data analysis revealed that operators 
achieved moderate to good SA; operators unfamiliar with EID information displays were 
able to develop and maintain comparable levels of SA to operators using traditional 
forms of single sensor-single indicator (SS-SI) information displays. With sufficient 
training and experience, operator SA is expected to benefit from the knowledge-based 
visual elements in the EID information displays. This project was researched in 
conjunction with the Cognitive Engineering Laboratory at the University of Toronto and 
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As new technologies are introduced into the nuclear industry, there is increasing interest 
in replacing existing hardwired monitoring systems in nuclear power plant control rooms 
with innovative human-machine interface (HMI) information displays (see Figure 1). 
However, it is important that the next-generation operator support systems are designed 
to overcome limitations in human information processing that are crucial to nuclear 
power plant safety. The design of interfaces with which users interact can essentially 
enhance or restrict perceptual and cognitive processes ranging from signal detection to 
decision making; such processes directly influence operator performance (Wickens & 
Hollands, 2000) and situation awareness (Endsley, 1995). A variety of design strategies 
and guidelines for nuclear power plant operator support systems have been developed 




Figure 1: Modernising the Forsmark 3 Boiling Water Reactor 
Nuclear Power Control Room 
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Ecological Interface Design (EID) is a design framework for HMI information 
displays that has been shown in existing studies to support operator performance for both 
anticipated and unanticipated events, which are often precursors to serious accidents 
(Vicente, 1999a). Although not substantiated by any experimental data thus far, the 
fundamental principles of EID suggest that there is also some level of support for 
operator situation awareness. This thesis will examine EID information displays in next-





Recent field studies of operator monitoring strategies in nuclear power plant control 
rooms have revealed that performance is limited by the need to identify relevant 
information against a noisy background (Mumaw, Roth, Vicente, & Burns, 2000). Much 
of the information related to the plant process is presented to the operators via a human-
machine interface (HMI). In many existing nuclear power plants, operators rely primarily 
on HMIs that consist of hardwired indicators and alarms to determine the state of the 
plant. Secondary sources of information include status logs, maintenance records, and 
field personnel. Given the large amount of information that needs to be processed by the 
operators, human information processing limitations become apparent: attention, 
perception, problem solving, and decision making are some of the abilities affected. 
Errors resulting from design deficiencies in the HMI at the Three Mile Island 
nuclear facility contributed significantly to the accident (Kemeny, 1979). It was found 
that a major pressure relief valve indicator failed to reflect the actual position of the 
valve. As well, no indicator existed to show the exact water level in the reactor core. 
Various design guidelines have been established as a result of the Three Mile Island 
incident. With the introduction of modern display technologies (e.g. LCD monitors, 
large-screen projectors) in existing nuclear power plant control rooms, there is growing 
interest in the design of HMI information displays. It is hoped that the displays will be 
able to convey relevant information needed by operators in a more efficient and reliable 
manner than previously with hardwired monitoring systems. In addition to design 
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guidelines, a number of design methodologies for HMIs have been developed over the 
last decade in order to overcome a variety of known human performance limitations and 
improve safety. Ecological Interface Design (EID) is one such design framework that 
aims to support operator information processing in safety critical situations (Vicente & 
Rasmussen, 1990, 1992). Of interest is to what extent EID supports operator situation 
awareness in anticipated and unanticipated scenarios. 
 
1.2 Scope and Objectives 
 
The OECD Halden Reactor Project hosted by the Norwegian Institute for Energy 
Technology (IFE) seeks to design and evaluate innovative operator support systems for 
next-generation nuclear power plant controls rooms. The University of Waterloo and the 
University of Toronto are collaborating with IFE to determine the practical benefits of 
EID in the evolving nuclear industry. In particular, the project examines the secondary 
non-reactor systems of the Swedish Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor nuclear power 
plant: turbine system, condenser system, and feedwater system. This thesis focuses on the 
design and evaluation of EID information displays for the turbine system portion of the 
plant. Note that the terms “turbine system” and “turbine secondary systems” are used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
 Although EID information displays have previously been successfully 
implemented in simulator (Dinadis & Vicente, 1996) and commercial (Itoh, Sakuma, & 
Monta, 1995) settings, most EID implementations have not been evaluated in 
representative industrial settings with trained operators (Jamieson, 2002). The current 
study evaluates EID information displays via a state-of-the art simulated control room 
environment (HAMMLAB) and licensed Forsmark 3 operators. In addition to using 
traditional usability metrics such as task response times for evaluating the EID 
information displays, the study measures a relatively new concept known as situation 
awareness (Endsley, 1995). This thesis aims to determine whether and how EID 
information displays support operator situation awareness (SA); possible effects of EID 




The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
 
- Development of EID information displays for the turbine secondary systems of a 
boiling water nuclear power plant. Note that all work found in Chapter 3 is specific to 
the turbine secondary systems (i.e. not condenser, feedwater secondary systems) and 
included specifically for the purposes of this thesis (i.e. not based on prior work). 
- Evaluation of EID information displays in a next-generation simulated control room 
environment with trained nuclear power plant operators. 
- Comparison of operator SA for EID information displays vs. traditional and advanced 
mimic displays. 
- Exploration of EID as a framework for supporting not only operator performance, but 
also operator SA in complex monitoring and control systems. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
 
- Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical foundations of EID and SA; prior research 
involving the application of EID and SA in process control environments is reviewed. 
The chapter also provides a brief background on the OECD Halden Reactor Project.  
- Chapter 3 documents the design process of EID information displays for the turbine 
secondary systems in the Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor nuclear power plant. 
- Chapter 4 describes the experimental design used for evaluating the EID information 
displays with operator SA as a primary measure.   
- Chapter 5 presents the results of the experiment and subsequent data analysis. 
- Chapter 6 discusses the findings of the experiment, i.e. possible explanations for the 
results, EID as a framework for supporting operator SA, and limitations of the study. 
- Chapter 7 summarizes the study and identifies future work to be done in the areas of 







Studies involving the application of the Ecological Interface Design (EID) framework in 
the nuclear power plant domain are numerous. Likewise, the concept of situation 
awareness (SA) in nuclear power plant control rooms is discussed in an increasing 
number of reports. Although the theoretical foundations of EID suggest support for SA, it 
has not been previously investigated in formative studies. This chapter introduces the 
EID framework and reviews the fundamentals of SA. A brief description of the OECD 
Halden Reactor Project (HRP) of which this study is a part is also provided in the 
following section. It should be noted that discussions revolving around the validity of SA 
as a concept and as a measure are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
2.1 Halden Reactor Project 
 
The OECD Halden Reactor Project (HRP) is an initiative hosted by the Norwegian 
Institute for Energy Technology (IFE) aimed at promoting research and development in 
the areas of nuclear power plant safety and reliability. National organisations in 20 
countries share resources to support the jointly financed programme. The programme 
specializes in providing solutions to extend fuel utilisation, exploring the degradation of 
core materials, and advancing man-machine systems. The study described in this thesis is 
part of a larger project aimed at designing and evaluating innovative human-machine 
interfaces (HMI), which falls under the latter of the three areas of research. Ecological 
Interface Design (EID) is one of the design approaches examined in the study and is 
largely a product of Canadian innovation. Because Canada does not contribute to the 
HRP, Canadian researchers do not have access to the findings in existing projects and are 
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not eligible for research funding. However, an agreement was reached with IFE for 
dissemination of research findings in exchange for independent funding from the NSERC 
Special Research Opportunity (SRO) program.  
 The Halden Man-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB) is a modern nuclear power 
plant simulation testbed used by HRP to study operator interaction with novel operator 
support systems and to develop new control room technologies (see Figure 2). The 
facility and its resources supported the evaluation of EID in a representative industrial 
environment. In this particular study, HAMMLAB’s underlying simulator emulated the 
Swedish Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor nuclear power plant and enabled the extraction 
of specific process information for display purposes. The HMIs were implemented with 
an in-house software tool known as Picasso (now under the name ProcSee), which 
specializes in the design of dynamic graphical forms. A number of power plant licensees 
contribute to the HRP and encourage plant operators and process engineers to participate 
in human-subject experiments involving HMIs.  
 
 
Figure 2: HAMMLAB Simulated Control Room Environment 
 
The experiment in this project employed licensed Forsmark 3 control room 
operators and was conducted by highly experienced simulation specialists, process 
engineers, and a team of experimentalists. The evaluation of EID on such a scale was 
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unprecedented, costing upwards of $1,000,000 CDN. The project itself was a 
collaborative effort between researchers at the University of Waterloo, University of 
Toronto, and IFE. Each institute focused on different areas of the system under 
investigation, i.e. secondary non-reactor systems: turbine system (University of 
Waterloo), condenser system (University of Toronto), and feedwater system (IFE). The 
combined results of the study will provide the industry with valuable information on the 
design and development of information displays for next-generation control rooms. This 
thesis in particular examines effects of an EID information display on operator situation 
awareness (SA) for the turbine secondary systems. The following sections will introduce 
the fundamentals of EID and SA. 
 
2.2 Ecological Interface Design 
 
Ecological Interface Design (EID) is a framework for designing interfaces for complex 
socio-technical, real-time, and systems such as nuclear power plants (Rasmussen & 
Vicente, 1989). EID differs from traditional user-centred based design approaches as it 
relies on the assertion that human behaviour is determined primarily by perceived 
constraints in the environment. The term “ecological” in EID originates from a school of 
psychology developed by Gibson (1979) known as ecological psychology. This field of 
psychology focuses on the human-environment relationships, in particular in relation to 
human perception in actual environments rather than in laboratory environments. EID 
borrows from ecological psychology in that the constraints of the work environment in a 
complex system are reflected perceptually (through an interface); therefore, affecting 
human behaviour.  
 The EID framework aims to make the constraints and complex relationships of 
the work environment perceptually evident (e.g. visible, audible) to the user. In essence, 
fewer cognitive resources would be necessary to determine whether elements in the work 
environment are operating within constraints. A direct and intentional result of the above 
is that more cognitive resources would be made available (i.e. freed) for higher cognitive 
activities such as problem solving and decision making, which are often required during 
safety-critical situations. The performance of such activities is presumed to be related to 
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the limitation of cognitive resources such as attention, working memory, and long-term 
memory (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). EID is based on two key concepts in cognitive 
engineering research: the Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) and the Skills, Rules, Knowledge 
(SRK) framework. 
Due to rapid advances in technologies and growing economic demands, there is a 
noticeable increase in the complexity of engineering systems (Vicente, 1999a). As a 
result, it is becoming more and more difficult for operators and engineers to anticipate 
events that may occur within the systems. Unanticipated events by definition cannot be 
determined in advance and thus cannot be directly prevented through training, 
procedures, or automation. A human-machine interface (HMI) for a complex system 
designed based solely on known scenarios frequently loses the flexibility to support 
unforeseen events. System safety is often compromised by the operators’ inability to 
adapt to new and unfamiliar situations (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1992). EID attempts to 
provide operators with the necessary tools and information to become active problem 
solvers as opposed to passive monitors. Interfaces designed following the EID framework 
aim to lessen mental workload when dealing with unfamiliar and unanticipated events, 
which are attributed to increased psychological pressure (Vicente, 1999b). 
In addition to providing operators with the means to successfully manage 
unanticipated events, EID is also proposed for systems that require users to become 
experts (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). Through the use of the AH and the SRK 
framework, EID enables novice users to more easily acquire advanced mental models 
that generally take many years of experience and training to develop. Likewise, EID 
provides a basis for continuous learning and distributed, collaborative work (Vicente, 
1999b). When faced with complex systems, it is not always possible for designers to ask 
operators what kinds of information they would like to see since each person understands 
the system at a different level (but rarely fully) and will provide very different answers. 
The EID framework allows designers to determine what kinds of information are required 
when it is not possible or feasible to ask users (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). It is not the 
intention of EID to replace existing design methodologies such as UCD and task analysis, 
but to complement them.  
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2.2.1 Abstraction Hierarchy 
 
The Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) is a key tool developed by Rasmussen (1985) for 
carrying out the Work Domain Analysis (WDA) process in the EID framework. It is used 
for modelling the work environment, or more commonly referred to as the work domain, 
via a five-level functional decomposition. Each level of abstraction in the model is related 
to the next; the relationships are indicated by means-ends (i.e. how-why) links. Elements 
at highest level of the model define the purposes and goals of the system. Elements at the 
lowest levels of the model indicate and describe the physical components (i.e. equipment) 
of the system. It is not uncommon for a Work Domain Analysis to yield multiple AH 
models, each examining the system at a different level of physical detail defined using 
another model called the Part-Whole Hierarchy (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). During 
the design process, AH models are used to determine the kinds of information that should 
be displayed on the interfaces and how the information should be arranged.  
 Each level of abstraction in the AH is a complete, but unique description of the 
work domain:  
 
- The Functional Purpose (FP) level describes the goals and purposes of the system; it 
is located at the top of the hierarchy. An AH typically includes more than one system 
goal such that the goals conflict or complement each other. The relationships between 
the goals indicate potential trade-offs and constraints within the work domain of the 
system (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004).  
- The Abstract Function (AF) level describes the underlying laws and principles that 
govern the goals of the system. These may be empirical laws in a physical system, 
judicial laws in a social system, or even economic principles in a commercial system. 
In general, the laws and principles focus on things that need to be conserved or that 
flow through the system such as mass (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004).  
- The Generalized Function (GF) level explains the processes involved in the laws and 
principles found at the AF level, i.e. how each abstract function is achieved. Causal 
relationships exist between the elements found at the GF level.  
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- The Physical Function (PFn) level reveals the physical components or equipment 
associated with the processes identified at the GF level. The capabilities and 
limitations of the components such as maximum capacity are also usually noted in the 
AH (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). 
- The Physical Form (PFo) level describes the condition, location, and physical 
appearance of the components shown at the PFn level. Physical characteristics may 
include things as colour, dimensions, and shape. 
 
2.2.2 Skills, Rules, and Knowledge Framework 
 
The Skills, Rules, Knowledge (SRK) framework or SRK taxonomy defines three types of 
behaviour or psychological processes present in operator information processing 
(Vicente, 1999a). The SRK framework was developed by Rasmussen (1983) to help 
designers combine information requirements for a system and aspects of human 
cognition. In EID, the SRK framework is used to determine how information should be 
displayed to take advantage of human perception and psychomotor abilities (Vicente, 
1999b). By supporting skill- and rule-based behaviours in familiar tasks, more cognitive 
resources may be devoted to knowledge-based behaviours, which are important for 
managing unanticipated events. The three categories essentially describe the possible 
ways in which information, for example, from a human-machine interface is extracted 
and understood: 
 
- Skill-based behaviour represents a type of behaviour involving routing activities that 
require very little or no conscious control to perform, i.e. automated (Rasmussen, 
1990). It is recommended that in order to support interaction via time-space signals, 
the operator should be able to act directly on the information displays and that the 
information should reflect the part-whole structure of the system (Vicente & 
Rasmussen, 1990, 1992). 
- Rule-based behaviour is characterized by the use of rules and procedures to carry out 
a course of action in a familiar situation (Rasmussen, 1990). Operators are not 
required to know the underlying principles and fundaments of a system to perform a 
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rule-based activity. To promote rule-based behaviour, designers should provide a 
consistent one-to-one mapping between the work domain constraints and cues in the 
information display (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990, 1992). 
- Knowledge-based behaviour involves higher cognitive activities, in particular relating 
to problem solving and planning. This type of behaviour is required for novel and 
unexpected situations. Representing the work domain in the form of an AH, i.e. 
embedding the abstraction levels in the information display, should provide an 
externalized mental model to support knowledge-based problem solving (Vicente & 




The EID framework has been applied to a variety of work domains since its introduction 
in the field of human factors engineering. More recently, researchers have explored the 
use of EID information displays in the areas of aviation (Dinadis & Vicente, 1999; Ho & 
Burns, 2003; Nadimian & Burns, 2004), network management (Kuo & Burns, 2000; 
Duez & Vicente, 2005), and patient monitoring (Hajdukiewicz, Doyle, Milgram, Vicente, 
& Burns, 1998; Watson, Russell, & Sanderson, 2000). However, a large portion of EID 
research over the years has been conducted in the domain of process control; many 
fundamental ideas of EID were tested using a small process control simulator called 
DURESS (DUal REservoir System Simulation). Process control systems range from 
nuclear and coal power plants to milk pasteurizers. The DURESS microworld simulated a 
thermal-hydraulic control process typically found in a power plant. It was originally used 
to evaluate how well EID information displays supported unfamiliar and unanticipated 
situations (Vicente, 1991). The experiment compared a non-EID physical (P) display of 
the microworld to an EID physical/function (P+F) display that contained information 
from all levels of abstraction. In general, the diagnostic performance of the participants 
for a number of tasks and events was found to be superior in the P+F condition. The 
improvement was attributed in part to the added levels of abstraction in the P+F display 
and not to the differences in the visual forms. These results provided a good basis for 
further developing the EID framework and exploring other possible applications. 
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 The DURESS simulated environment has since been adapted to study both 
control and monitoring behaviour (Pawlak & Vicente, 1996), EID in collaborative work 
environments (Garabet & Burns, 2004), and the effects of sensor noise on EID 
information displays (St-Cyr, 2006). Because of the generic and limited work 
environment depicted in DURESS, researchers have sought to analyse more 
representative process control systems to determine whether the benefits of EID would 
also apply in the other settings. Dinadis and Vicente (1996) applied the EID framework 
to a larger-scale feedwater system that is more representative of the complexity found in 
a nuclear power plant. The study incorporated many traditional interface design 
principles such as visual momentum and perceptual organisation, which were found to be 
highly complementary to the EID approach. The resulting EID information displays were 
successfully implemented in an ABB Limited plant simulator, i.e. showing proof-of-
concept, but not evaluated with human subjects. 
A notable industrial example is the application of the EID framework by 
researchers at the Toshiba Corporation (Itoh, Sakuma, & Monta, 1995) to a next-
generation boiling water reactor nuclear power plant. However, the EID framework was 
used in combination with Multilevel Flow Models (MFM) describing the goals and 
functions of specific plant processes, which are similar to elements found at the 
Functional Purpose and Generalized Function levels in the AH. Separate EID information 
displays were designed for the plant start up and decay heat removal processes presented 
in the MFMs. Although an analytical study was done on the AH model showing 
favourable results, no empirical testing was conducted on the actual displays. 
Jamieson (2002) notes that there is currently a lack of literature that focuses on 
empirical evaluations of the EID framework, which involve professional operators in 
more realistic plant settings. In his study, EID information displays for a petrochemical 
refining process were evaluated with 30 skilled operators in a full-scope industrial 
simulator. The experiment compared three types of interfaces: current mimic, EID (P+F), 
and EID augmented with task-based information (P+F+T). The results confirmed that the 
EID information displays improved performance in terms of trial completion times and 
number of control actions required. Furthermore, diagnostic accuracy was found to be 
greater for the P+F+T interface; a noticeable increase in performance was noted for 
 13
abnormal and unanticipated scenarios. These findings substantiate previous research in 
laboratory simulations with novice operators. 
A primary goal of the HRP project described in this thesis is to evaluate advanced 
interfaces including EID information displays based on an existing boiling water nuclear 
power plant (Forsmark 3 in Sweden) with professional licensed operators. The 
HAMMLAB simulator environment attempts to replicate a traditional control room with 
upgraded technologies such as LCD monitors and projection screens. It is hoped that the 
combined results of the study will encourage industry to adopt innovative approaches, in 
particular the EID framework, in the development of next-generation operator support 
systems. Note that the above examples are but a few of the many studies in the process 
control work domain. Refer to Vicente (2002), Burns and Hajdukiewicz (2004) for a 
more thorough review of prior applications of EID. 
 
2.3 Situation Awareness 
 
Situation Awareness (SA) in the context of dynamic decision making is defined as “the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” 
(Endsley, 1988). In brief, SA can be described as a person’s state of knowledge or a 
mental model of the work environment for a specific set of goals and decision tasks. 
Endsley (1995) emphasizes that SA should not be confounded with processes and 
constructs involved to achieving, acquiring, and maintaining that state; i.e. attention, 
perception, working memory, long-term memory, decision making, execution of actions. 
Although there have been a variety of attempts at defining SA, Endsley’s description of 
the concept has been the most widely received and applied in studying dynamic decision 
making. According to Endsley’s model, SA is a function of (1) an individual’s 
information-processing abilities, (2) the system design, and (3) other features in the work 
environment including workload and stress. It is therefore possible to support SA through 
training and experience. However, given the increasing amount of information that is 
being made available to operators in dynamic systems, it is imperative that HMIs are 
designed to facilitate the acquisition of relevant information for building SA. 
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 SA is defined as the result of three hierarchical phases or levels that describe the 
key processes involved in achieving a state of knowledge of the work environment: 
 
- Level 1: Perception of Elements in the Environment. The perception of relevant cues 
in the environment is an important first phase in the development of SA. Operators in 
process control plants require specific data on mass and energy flows, dynamic 
processes, and equipment status in order to make decisions effectively. In the aviation 
domain, it has been shown that 76% of SA errors occur at the first level (Jones & 
Endsley, 1996). In the majority of the cases, all relevant information was present in 
the environment, but was not detected. 
- Level 2: Comprehension of the Current Situation. The second phase involves the 
integration of the perceived Level 1 elements that are relevant to decision goals via 
subjective interpretation and objective significance (Flach, 1995). In achieving Level 
2 SA, operators acquire a holistic picture of the environment that includes the 
significance of the objects and events within it. Novices typically do not have the 
knowledge and experience to draw upon for developing Level 2 SA. In the same 
aviation study by Jones and Endsley (1996), approximately 19% of SA errors occur at 
the second level.  
- Level 3: Projection of Future Status. The ability to predict future actions of elements 
and events represents the highest level of SA, i.e. highest level of understanding. In 
order for an operator to achieve Level 3 SA, a highly developed mental model of the 
current situation (Level 2 SA) is required, which depends on elements perceived in 
the environment (Level 1 SA). Experts typically spend a large quantity of resources 
developing Level 3 SA as projections allow for proactive decision making. Jones and 
Endsley (1996) found that only 6% of SA errors in aviation occurred at the third 
level; this was attributed to the difficulty in attaining Level 1 and Level 2 SA.  
 
The concept of SA first appeared in the aviation industry, measuring pilot and aircraft 
controller understanding of particular situations (Endsley, 1995). However, applications 
have since extended beyond aviation and now include large system operations, military 
tactical and strategic systems, and medical or surgical operations (Endsley, 2000). In a 
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process control environment, the three phases of SA generally involve the detection of 
process disturbances, interpretation of the event, and planning to remediate the situation 
(Roth, Randall, & Stubler, 1993).  
 As mentioned previously, the development and maintenance of SA is largely 
influenced by the cognitive mechanisms in information processing and the design of 
interfaces, which are often used to represent the work environment. In a complex system, 
attention restricts the operator’s ability to perceive multiple cues and elements in parallel 
(Level 1 SA). It is possible to overcome some of the limitations in directing attention by 
increasing the perceptual salience of cues based on priority and utilising information 
sampling strategies obtained through training and experience (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 
2003). Another important bottleneck in achieving and maintaining SA is working 
memory. Working memory is responsible for interpreting perceived cues (Level 2 SA) 
and making projections (Level 3 SA). Limitations in working memory are spatial and 
temporal in nature, i.e. only a limited number of elements can be stored in working 
memory for a short period of time before decaying. Novices and operators dealing with 
novel situations require more working memory resources (Endsley & Garland, 2000). 
Experienced operators have developed mechanisms through training and experience to 
manage limited working memory resources such as chunking (Wickens & Hollands, 
2000). However, it is hypothesized that long-term memory structures including mental 
models and schema are often used to support working memory. In essence, the structures 
model the default behaviour of the system allowing for a smaller subset of elements that 
are of interest to be stored in working memory, i.e. rather than all elements in the system 
to prevent overload. The mental models and schema can provide much of the higher 
levels of SA; the structures are typically only present in experienced operators. SA can 
therefore be thought of as a unique product of the perception of relevant environment 
cues, working memory processes, and long-term memory structures.  
 In emphasising the constraints of a work environment, EID seeks to support the 
cognitive mechanisms described above. The application of the SRK framework to the 
design of graphical elements in the interfaces aims to make much of the fault detection 
process skill-based. Advanced visualisation techniques such as emergent features and 
salience control allow for many variables in the environment to be monitored in parallel. 
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As a result, attention is directed to the most relevant cues that indicate potential constraint 
violations thus supporting Level 1 SA. By reducing the amount of attentional resources 
required for perception, more can be dedicated to the development of Level 2 and 3 SA. 
In addition to promoting skill-based behaviour, EID supports knowledge-based behaviour 
via visualisation of the mental model described previously as the Abstraction Hierarchy 
(AH). In providing a physical and functional representation of the system to the 
operators, knowledge existing in experienced operator long-term memory is available to 
novices. The higher levels of SA can be achieved using fewer working memory resources 
due to the support provided by shifting the long-term memory structures to the interface. 
The experiment described in this thesis will provide empirical evidence as to whether 
EID supports SA. 
SA is believed to be necessary, but not sufficient for good performance in 
dynamic decision making (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 2003). Performance outcomes are 
affected by a variety of other factors such as workload demands, execution accuracy, and 
system capabilities. For example, an operator with perfect SA may perform poorly due to 
lack of training in carrying out the proper actions. Likewise, it is possible for an operator 
to have poor SA and perform reasonably well by attempting to account for missing 
information or simply by sheer luck. Because of this distinction, SA cannot be measured 
using traditional performance indicators such as response time. A number of SA 
measurement techniques have been developed within the last decade, a few of which are 




SA is a direct measure of an operator’s understanding of the system, in particular relating 
to the current and future states of the system. As explained previously, the level of SA 
possessed by an operator increases the probability of making good decisions and 
performing well in activities like problem solving. In order to evaluate design concepts 
and ideas, it is generally necessary to make relative comparisons since it is difficult to 
determine a benchmark representing good SA for a particular application. In this thesis, 
operator SA for EID information displays is compared to that of more traditional mimic-
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oriented displays. Although SA can be measured indirectly by assessing the cognitive 
processes involved, it is not always possible to infer one from the other. Accordingly, 
direct measures of SA are of particular interest in the evaluation phase. There exist both 
subjective and objective direct measures of SA. In general, subjective measures assess 
SA via self- or expert-ratings during a specified period, which can be as simple as using a 
Likert (number) scale. However, ratings can be influenced by factors such as 
performance and awareness of one’s own SA; zero correlation has been found between 
subjective measures and objective measures (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 2003). Objective 
measures typically assess SA via queries in regards to aspects in the environment and 
examining the accuracy of the responses. Several challenges in administering objective 
measures include establishing appropriate queries and intervals as they have the potential 
for interfering with performance, workload, memory, and attention. Below is a brief 
overview of three SA measurement techniques, two of which are used in the evaluation 
of EID information displays described in this thesis. 
 
2.3.1.1 Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE) 
 
The Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE) measure is a real-time subjective measure of 
operator SA developed for the study in question by the Halden Reactor Project. The 
methodology is similar to the Situational Awareness Rating Scale (SARS) developed by 
Waag and Houck (1994) in which observers rate pilot SA based on observed behaviours. 
HOPE addresses operator Level of Understanding (LoU) as it relates to a variety of 
cognitive processes in a work situation. Real-time open probes via verbal queries are used 
to determine operator LoU. For example, operators may be asked if everything is normal, 
what strategies they are following with respect to the current state of the system, or 
whether a specific problem has been resolved. Such open probes are natural in a control 
room environment since operators generally provide status updates to other plant 
personnel. It is important that the probes are open-ended to the extent that it prevents 
cueing, i.e. guiding the operator in problem solving. Rather than measuring response time 
of the probes, an expert observer rates the operator’s LoU on a scale of 0 (poor 
understanding) to 3 (full understanding). An aggregated LoU is calculated from the 
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scores of several probes during each scenario in the experiment. Please refer to Appendix 
G for a full description of the LoU scale. 
 The content, format, and timing of the verbal queries are pre-defined for each 
scenario based on the expected events and performance requirements. It may be 
necessary for the expert evaluator to modify the queries since operator activities can 
influence scenario development. Before the experiment, operators are informed that a 
member of the experimental team will act as a representative from plant management 
who may call the control room for status updates, i.e. probes. Because status calls are 
typically considered secondary tasks, operators are likely to dismiss it during high 
workload periods. In order to prevent this, the simulator running the scenario is frozen 
while the operator responds to a probe; however, the information displays remain 
available and are not blanked. Each probe is under a minute in length to minimize 
potential interference with scenario progression. The operators will respond to probes 
verbally based on their current understanding of the situation. The expert evaluator can 
also infer LoU from observations such as operator interventions with the process, search 
for information, HMI navigation, and reaction to alarms. It is expected that LoU can be 
reliably measured and predict operator performance. 
 
2.3.1.2 Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) 
 
The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) is perhaps the most 
widely used SA measure in domains such as aviation, air traffic control, process control, 
teleoperations, and military operations. Unlike subjective measures, SAGAT aims to 
evaluate operator response to queries about specific elements in the work environment. 
The accuracy of the responses can be used to objectively determine an operator’s SA for 
a particular scenario. The queries are established ahead of time based on a detailed 
analysis of SA requirements, which is essentially a goal-directed task analysis that 
attempts to determine all information required for a particular decision (Endsley, Bolté, & 
Jones, 2003). The information identified in the analysis is similar to the variables 
extracted in the EID design approach, though specific to a particular task or scenario and 
categorized by SA level. Each query represents a variable identified in the SA 
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requirements analysis and measures one or multiple levels of SA. A list of queries is 
administered to the operator at randomly selected intervals within the scenario. The 
simulator is frozen and the displays are blanked while the operator responds to the 
queries. For example, operators may be asked to indicate the water level in a tank, 
whether it was rising or falling, and what (if any) alarm it was approaching.  
 When the operator completes the list of queries, which takes around 2 to 3 
minutes, the scenario is resumed. There have been concerns as to whether the scenario 
freezes interfere with operator memory and performance (Pew, 1995). Validation studies 
of SAGAT (Endsley, 1995, 2000) have shown that participants are able to resume 
scenario tasks with minimal effects to performance. However, SAGAT is only reliable to 
the extent that it adheres to certain requirements: randomized freezes to prevent cueing, 
appropriate time interval between freezes, and queries that cover information required for 
all three levels of SA (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 2003). One of the major advantages of 
measuring SA with SAGAT is that the results provide designers with an idea where 
improvements in the information displays can be made. In particular, it highlights levels 
at which specific information or variables are lacking in terms of design. Limitations of 
SAGAT pertain mainly to feasibility of scenario freezes in real-world or field-testing 
settings such as military exercises where mid-scenario interruptions are not possible. This 
is typically not a problem in process control simulation environments that can be paused 




Situation Awareness Control Room Inventory (SACRI) is an objective measure of 
operator SA developed by the Halden Reactor Project for process control plant 
environments. The SACRI measure combines elements from SAGAT and Signal 
Detection Theory (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Signal Detection Theory is applicable in 
situations where there are two discrete states in the environment: signal and noise. During 
the perception process, an operator can decide whether a specific signal or variable 
condition is present or not. The result of the decision falls under one of four categories: 
(1) hit, (2) miss, (3) false alarm, or (4) correct rejection. Perfect performance is achieved 
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when there are no misses or false alarms. In process control, operators are concerned with 
detecting drifts in the plant process. Depending on the classification, a measure of 
operator sensitivity to changes and response bias can be calculated (Hogg, Follesø, 
Strand-Volden, & Torralba, 1995). The sensitivity measure is thought to measure 
accuracy of SA assessment, while response bias provides a qualitative indication of what 
strategies are employed for certain process fluctuations, i.e. conservative or risky 
strategies. When comparing different process control information displays, SDT can be 
used to develop an overall view of operator SA as well as performance. For example, two 
information displays may produce similar SA accuracy, but one results in better 
projection from proper strategy selection. 
 A SACRI score is derived by applying elements of SAGAT in the evaluation and 
elements of SDT in the analysis of the collected data. During the experiment, operators 
answer a battery of questions about the state of the process at random freezes in the 
scenarios. The queries used involve responses that classify variables roughly as 
increasing, decreasing, or no change. The responses are evaluated against data found in 
simulator logs and categorized into one of the four SDT decision conditions; operator 
sensitivity and response bias values are calculated from the number of responses found in 
each category. Please refer to Appendix H for complete operator sensitivity and response 
bias formulae. An operator sensitivity score of 1.0 is equivalent to perfect performance, 
while any score below 0.5 indicates performance no better than if the decision was made 
by chance. A response bias of 1 represents zero bias, i.e. no overestimation, no 
underestimation of particular variable values. A response bias over 1 indicates 
overestimation or risky bias, while a response bias under 1 indicates underestimation or 
conservative bias (Hogg, Follesø, Strand-Volden, & Torralba, 1995). The SACRI scores 
are used in place of accuracy scores that are typically calculated in the SAGAT 





Ecological Interface Design for Turbine 
Secondary Systems 
 
The Ecological Interface Design (EID) framework consists of two key stages: the Work 
Domain Analysis (WDA) and the Skills, Rules, and Knowledge (SRK) framework. The 
WDA provides designers with information relating to the physical and functional aspects 
of the system. Specifically, the analysis reveals work domain constraints and complex 
system relationships; this information is subsequently transformed into visual (or 
auditory) forms that take advantage of human perceptual and problem solving abilities as 
described by the SRK framework. Many advanced visualisation techniques have been 
established to achieve the jump from analysis to design (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). 
The following sections describe the EID design process and results for the turbine 
secondary systems of the Swedish Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor (BWR) nuclear 
power plant. 
 
3.1 System Description and Boundary 
 
A typical modern nuclear power plant consists of a primary reactor system and a number 
of secondary systems designed to convert thermal (steam) energy into electrical energy. 
Despite significant differences in the steam-heating process, electricity generation via the 
secondary systems in both nuclear and fossil fuel power plants rely on the same principle: 
rotation within the generator. The process essentially involves turning turbine blades with 
high-pressure steam, which directly results in generator rotation. In order for the process 
to continue, the secondary systems are also responsible for condensing post-turbine steam 
and returning it to the reactor.  
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In a boiling water reactor plant (BWR) such as Forsmark 3, water is boiled 
directly in the reactor core, rather than through a separate loop and boiler as found in 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) and CANDU nuclear power plants. The secondary 
systems in a BWR therefore must take into account traces of radioactivity in the water 
and differences in pressure. Although the principles behind electricity generation is 
identical in all nuclear power plants, the actual process can differ greatly from plant to 
plant; such details are reflected in the physical and functional attributes of the system, 
which are revealed in the Work Domain Analysis (WDA). 
Unlike user-centred design approaches, the EID framework begins with an 
analysis of the work environment, i.e. the nuclear power plant. Physical boundaries were 
established between the secondary systems in the Swedish Forsmark 3 BWR nuclear 
power plant to allow for concurrent analyses: turbine, condenser, and feedwater 
secondary systems. Recall that the scope of the project is limited to the secondary, non-
reactor, side of the plant. Additionally, this thesis focuses primarily on the turbine 
secondary systems as delineated in Figure 3. A number of physical components can be 
seen within the turbine system boundary including a high-pressure turbine, three low-
pressure turbines, a moisture separator reheater, a generator, and various control valves. 
Operators are largely concerned with monitoring and controlling the plant process. 
Accordingly, the scope of the system was narrowed to exclude control systems (e.g. 
governor), actuators (e.g. electro-hydraulic valve actuators), and sensors (e.g. 
temperature). Troubleshooting of the excluded components is typically carried out by 
maintenance and field personnel.  
While the operation of a nuclear power plant is collaborative in nature, the topic 
of EID and collaboration is beyond the scope of this thesis. See Garabet and Burns (2004) 
for a discussion on the subject. As a result, the social aspects of the work environment 
were also excluded from the system boundary. The initial study focuses on EID 
information displays for a single user, i.e. the turbine operator, in a multi-user 
environment. By clearly defining the physical boundaries between the turbine, condenser, 
and feedwater secondary systems, the interactions between them become apparent during 
the analysis. Furthermore, it allows for relevant physical and functional attributes of the 
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system to be modelled via two WDA processes: (1) part-whole decomposition and (2) 




Figure 3: Turbine, Condenser, and Feedwater System Boundaries 
 
3.2 Work Domain Analysis 
 
3.2.1 Part-Whole Decomposition 
 
A part-whole decomposition analysis yields a hierarchical model of the system at three 
different levels of detail: (1) system, (2) subsystem, and (3) component (Burns & 
Hajdukiewicz, 2004). Given that the turbine secondary systems consist of over a hundred 
process-related components, it was necessary to begin the analysis at the highest (system) 
level of detail. The part-whole model at the system level provides a general overview of 
the system typically by illustrating the inputs and outputs, i.e. representing the system by 
a black box. Given the many interactions between the three secondary systems, some 
outputs from the turbine system appear as inputs to the condenser and feedwater systems. 
The part-whole model at the second level details subsystem interactions within the 
system black box, i.e. representing subsystems with black boxes. Likewise, the part-
whole model at the third level opens the subsystem black boxes to reveal interactions 
between actual physical components such as control valves and turbines. 
The part-whole models allow designers to determine how information can be 
grouped in the graphical displays. For example, high-level information found at the 
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system level of detail (e.g. electrical power output) is generally shown on overview or 
status displays, whereas lower-level information found at the component level of detail 
(e.g. valve position) is shown on detailed displays. The models also provide designers 
with a better understanding of the system and its physical processes. A range of resources 
were used at this stage of the analysis including plant specifications, piping and 
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Figure 4: Part-Whole Model of the Turbine System at the System (Black Box) Level 
 
 At the highest level, the turbine system is represented by a black box (see Figure 
4); the flow of process materials across the physical boundary is emphasized. Each box 
represents a physical component or an encapsulation of physical components in the 
system identified by a set of numbers (see Table 18 in Appendix B for a complete 
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legend). Each arrow represents a process material (colour, see Figure 43 in Appendix B 
for a complete legend) and its expected flow direction. Inputs are shown as unfilled 
rectangles. Outputs are shown as rounded unfilled rectangles. The primary reactor 
systems transfer steam into the turbine secondary systems for electrical power generation. 
Electrical energy is transferred out of the turbine system black box to various switchyards 
for consumer distribution. Exhaust steam and drain materials from the processes are 
distributed to a variety of secondary systems including the condenser and feedwater 
systems. For example, bleed steam from the turbine system is transferred to the feedwater 
system for reheating purposes. Note that vacuum/suction from the condenser system is 
not technically a process material as there is no flow, but a pressure component required 
for other process materials to enter the condenser system from the turbine system. 
 Once the turbine system inputs and outputs were identified, the black box was 
opened up to reveal numerous supporting subsystems: steam reheat systems, seal and 
leakage system, lubrication and jacking oil system, seal oil system, and generator cooling 
system (see Error! Reference source not found.). The flow of process materials is again 
emphasized at the subsystem detail level. For example, exhaust steam from the high-
pressure turbine enters the steam reheat system before reaching the low-pressure turbines 
as superheated steam. At the subsystem level of detail, process materials flowing into the 
turbine system (inputs) arrive at specific subsystem destinations. Similarly, process 
materials flowing out of the turbine system (outputs) exit specific subsystems. 
Information found in the model at this level provides designers and eventually users, 
generally via system-specific (vs. system-wide) status displays, with a more detailed 
overview of the system.  
 The lowest level of detail was modelled by breaking down the subsystems into 
individual physical components; the resulting model is quite similar to a P&ID diagram. 
For purposes of simplicity, a part-whole model was developed for each subsystem (see 
Figures 6, 7, 8, 9 for steam related subsystems; see Figures 44, 45, 46 in Appendix C for 
remainder). Included in each model are list of indicators. The main steam subsystem 
(421) consists primarily of four turbine control valves, one bypass control valve, and a 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































entering the high-pressure turbine. Exhaust steam from the high-pressure turbine is 
redirected to the steam reheat subsystem (422), which is comprised of a moisture 
separator, shell and tube heat exchangers, tanks, and numerous valves (e.g. control, stop, 
check valves). Superheated steam leaving the shell and tube heat exchangers enter three 
low-pressure turbines for further energy conversion. The main steam (421) and steam 
reheat (422) subsystems are supported by the seal and leakage steam (424), lubrication 
and jacking oil (412), seal oil (416), governing oil (452), generator cooling (445), and bus 
bar cooling (614) subsystems. The steam valves subsystem (311) pre-regulates steam 
flow to the main steam subsystem. The functional attributes including purposes and 
process descriptions of each part-whole model are further detailed in the abstraction 
hierarchy analysis discussed in the following section. 
 The advantage of clearly identifying the inputs and outputs of the system is that 
individual models from each of the secondary systems (turbine, condenser, feedwater) 
can be readily integrated. For the purposes of deriving a large-screen overview 
information display of the secondary systems, the part-whole models were merged. The 
discussion of overview displays is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the resulting 
integrated models of the part-whole system (Figure 47 in Appendix C) and subsystem 
(Figure 48 in Appendix C) levels are available for reference. 
 
3.2.2 Abstraction Hierarchy 
 
While a part-whole model provides details concerning the physical attributes of the work 
environment, an abstraction hierarchy (AH) model focuses on the functional attributes 
(Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). The AH analysis examines the means and ends (i.e. how 
and why, respectively) of the system by modelling it at five distinct levels of abstraction: 
(1) Functional Purpose, (2) Abstract Function, (3) Generalized Function, (4) Physical 
Function, and (5) Physical Form (Vicente, 1999b). Elements at lower levels of 
abstraction provide the means to which elements at higher levels are achieved. The model 
is used at the design phase to determine the kinds of information to display along with the 
associated constraints and relationships. Furthermore, the information is organized based 
on the different levels of abstraction to promote knowledge-based behaviour as described 
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in the skills, rules, and knowledge (SRK) framework. The AH is one of the key defining 
characteristics of the EID framework in contrast to other design approaches.  
 A variety of different resources were used in the development of each abstraction 
level in the AH. At the Functional Purpose level, the goals of the system were determined 
by consulting operator training manuals (Ontario Power Generation, 1988) and prior EID 
research (Dinadis & Vicente, 1996). The laws and principles describing the goals of the 
system at the Abstract Function level were investigated using textbooks, in particular 
relating to thermodynamics (Çengel, 1997) and electromagnetism (Halliday, Resnick, & 
Walker, 1996). Similarly, textbooks and operator training manuals relating to the 
operation of turbines (Lindsley, 2000; Ontario Power Generation, 1994) and generators 
(Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2003) in nuclear power plants were used to 
investigate processes described at the Generalized Function level. Plant literature referred 
to in the part-whole analysis, as well as the part-whole models, were employed directly to 
describe the Physical Function and Physical Form levels. Process experts were consulted 
throughout to acquire Forsmark 3 plant-specific information. 
 The turbine system was examined at each part-whole level of detail yielding three 
separate AH models, which combined with the part-whole models formed a complete 
work domain model. At the part-whole system level of detail, the AH provides a black 
box overview (see Figure 10). In a complex system, there are generally multiple goals 
that constrain one another due to practical limitations and tradeoffs, e.g. the goal of 
generating electricity to specified levels is constrained by several safety factors such as 
maintaining safe reactor pressure and turbine speeds. Specific laws and principles 
described at the Abstract Function level regulate the above goals, which are in turn 
carried out by processes found at the Generalized Function level. As shown in Figure 10, 
the first and second laws of thermodynamics along with the Faraday-Lenz law underlie 
the goal of electricity generation. The processes of steam throttling and expansion at the 
Generalized Function level are associated with the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics. Likewise, the process of electromagnetic induction is associated with 
the Faraday-Lenz law. At the Physical Function level, equipment identified in the part-
whole analysis such as turbines and generators are linked to the corresponding 
Generalized Function processes. The physical properties for each piece of equipment 
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(e.g. size, location, capacity) are recorded at the Physical Form level; for practical 
purposes, this level was omitted in the current phase of analysis. Plant literature and 
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Figure 10: Abstraction Hierarchy at Part-Whole System Level 
 
 Similar models were constructed based on the part-whole subsystem and 
component levels. At the part-whole subsystem level of detail, the AH expands on the 
functional attributes of the black box system (see Figure 11). Specifically, the Abstract 
Function and Generalized Function levels include elements relating to the supporting 
subsystems identified in the part-whole analysis. For example, the steam reheat 
subsystem is responsible for mass separation (liquid-vapour) and transformation 
(saturated-superheated) abstract functions; this corresponds to moisture separation and 
steam reheating Generalized Functions. Causal (horizontal) links were included at the 
Abstract Function and Generalized Function level to emphasize process flow. At the 
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Physical Function level, the subsystems identified in the part-whole analysis are 
reiterated. Recall that elements from each level are connected to others above or below 
via means-end (vertical) links.  
 At the part-whole component level, an AH was developed for the main steam and 
steam reheat subsystems (421 and 422, Figure 12). Note that the subsystems were merged 
to provide better process flow continuity. Although many of the goals at the Functional 
Purpose level are similar to the ones found at the part-whole system and subsystem levels 
of detail, the elements at the Abstract Function and Generalized Function levels are 
associated directly with the individual components at the Physical Function level. For 
example, tanks in the steam reheat subsystem are treated as drain stores for other 
processes, which are associated with mass storage. 
 A major challenge encountered due to the modularisation of the secondary 
systems was consistency between each subsystem. In effect, specific outputs of the 
turbine secondary systems should be consistent with the inputs to the condenser or 
feedwater secondary systems. For example, the energy sink representing steam discharge 
in the turbine system should be shown as an energy source in the condenser system. The 
interactions between the systems were emphasized to avoid “losing” information during 
the design phase of the project. The AH models at the system (Figure 49 in Appendix C) 
part-whole level for the turbine, condenser, and feedwater secondary systems were in the 
end combined to aid the design of a large-screen overview information display. Again, it 
should be noted that the discussion of overview displays for the three secondary systems 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Information Display Design 
 
3.3.1 Information Analysis 
 
The information analysis stage attempts to bridge the gap between system analysis (i.e. 
models) and design (i.e. information displays). Unlike other design approaches, EID 
relies primarily on the AH models to determine what information needs to be included in 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rather than on user experience or specific operating tasks. In a large complex system like 
a nuclear power plant, it is often not practical to gain information by asking operators 
what they would like to see on the human-machine interfaces (HMI). Suggestions tend to 
vary widely based on expertise, while some operators feel that there is no need to include 
more information. Furthermore, information based on task analyses does not necessarily 
support unanticipated events; tasks are known anticipated events. The EID framework 
concentrates on obtaining information that supports both anticipated and unanticipated 
events. However, it is possible to combine multiple design approaches to provide 
complementary information in the HMIs (Burns & Hajdukiewicz, 2004). 
Information to be translated on to the EID information displays is obtained by 
extracting variables from the AH models developed in the previous phase (Burns & 
Hajdukiewicz, 2004). The variables are identified by asking how each element in the AH 
can be measured. For instance, the goal of generating electricity to a specified set point 
can be measured by real and reactive power output variables. Measures related to flow, 
balance, and conservation were extracted from elements at the Abstract Function level. 
Likewise, process related variables such as temperature and pressure were identified at 
the Generalized Function level. At the Physical Function level, equipment can be 
measured by examining its capacity and capability. 
 
Table 1: Extracted Variable at the Abstract Function Level 
Variable Energy in from the reactor 
Description Specific enthalpy of steam leaving the reactor 
Units kJ/kg 
Availability Calculated: steam table lookup 
Constraints Max: ~2,772.1 kJ/kg 
Min: 0 kJ/kg 
Normal: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg 
Relationships Approximately equal to energy into high-pressure 
turbine 
 
 The information analysis phase also involves identifying information availability 
and constraints, which are key aspects in EID information displays. These attributes serve 
as design parameters for creating graphical elements and were recorded in tables for easy 
referencing (see Table 1 for an example entry, Table 19 and Table 20 in Appendix D for 
 38
all more complete entries). A variable can be measured via sensors or calculated from 
other variables, or is simply not available, in which case it cannot be designed into the 
displays. Like many existing nuclear power plants, energy cannot be measured through 
sensors. Instead, the value must be obtained through a steam table lookup using 
temperature or pressure values. 
 Two types of constraints exist for variables: single variable constraints and 
multivariate constraints. The range-limit of a particular variable (i.e. maximum and 
minimum values) is considered a single variable constraint. The relationships between 
multiple variables are considered multivariate constraints. Energy leaving the reactor is 
related to energy flowing into the high-pressure turbine in that the two are approximately 
equal (see Table 1). It is possible for one variable to be related to another through 
complex mathematical expressions as dictated by known physical models. Apparent 
power, for example, is equal to the hypotenuse of a right-angle triangle consisting of real 
and reactive power (see Figure 17). The relationship is known as the power triangle. The 
following section describes how the extracted variables and related properties were 
transformed into graphical forms. 
 
3.3.2 Graphical Forms 
 
The information analysis tables essentially provide design parameters for graphical 
visualisation, helping narrow the gap between analysis and design. Specifically, the 
constraints and relationships of the variables were incorporated into the graphical forms 
and organized in a manner that conformed to the skills, rules, knowledge (SRK) 
framework. The SRK framework describes three different types of behaviour or 
psychological processes present in operator information processing: skill-based, rule-
based, and knowledge-based behaviour. For example, designing a graphic that shows the 
difference between two values rather than requiring the operator to perform the 
calculation mentally supports skill-based behaviour. In contrast, graphical forms 
representing variables can be arranged in a display based on the AH levels to support 
knowledge-based behaviour. Refer to Chapter 2 for a more thorough background 
description of the SRK framework. The displays went through several iterations based on 
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the need for visual consistency between the three secondary systems, feedback from the 
pilot study, and practical simulator limitations (i.e. implementation constraints).  
 To aid the design process, Burns and Hajdukiewicz (2004) have developed a 
“Visual Thesaurus” from which graphical forms can be modelled. Many of the generic 
graphical forms utilize advanced visualisation techniques such as emergent features, 
which were used to emphasize variable constraints and relationships. An emergent 
feature is essentially a global property linking a set of individual variables or attributes, 
which are not as evident if represented in isolation (Wickens & Hollands, 2000). The 
maximum and minimum limits should be apparent on a single variable with respect to the 
current value. Similarly, deviations in the expected relationship between multiple 
variables should be of high salience. Such visual features promote skill-based behaviour 
by reducing cognitive resources required for detecting important changes. The following 
subsections describe the design of graphical forms at the different levels of abstraction in 
the AH model. 
 
3.3.2.1 Design at the Functional Purpose Level 
 
Due to the complex relationships that exist between a number of variables, including 
time, the design phase focused largely on visualising multivariate constraints. Variables 
found at the Functional Purpose level related to the reactor pressure (Figures 13, 14, 15), 
turbine speeds (Figure 16), and generator output (Figure 17) were considered to be 
multiple variables. The goal of maintaining safe reactor pressure while generating 
electrical power to a specific set point involves all of the aforementioned variables.  
Because the relationship between reactor pressure (Figure 13) and turbine control 
valve positions (Figures 14, 15) is too complex for calculation- or simulation-based 
design, the graphical forms were separated, but placed in close proximity to each other. 
As a result, it is possible for operators to rely on training and experience to determine 
whether the relationship holds via pattern recognition. The visualisation is intended to 
support both skill- and knowledge-based behaviour. Reactor pressure is shown over time 
(i.e. rate) based on changes in the turbine control valve positions and is constrained by 
specific maximum and minimum values. Alarms are triggered at these limits (shown as 
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H4 and L2 in Figure 13), but the trend over time provides operators with a visual 
indication of whether reactor pressure is increasing or decreasing towards these limits. It 
should be noted that if an alarm is triggered, the current value is highlighted based on 
existing severity colours (i.e. yellow, red) and operators are trained to consult written 












60 30 0 mins1545  




















VB3 VB4  
 
 
Figure 14: Valve Position Graphic (Polar 





















Figure 15: Valve Position Graphic (Grid) 
at the Functional Purpose Level 
 
Although turbine control valve position is associated with reactor pressure, the 
graphical form representing the former includes many individual constraints. In 
particular, valve position set points established by the governor support system based on 
power generation requirements are shown in Figure 14 as ticks and in Figure 15 as blue 
diamonds. The current valve positions are specified by white dots, which will under 
normal conditions move towards the corresponding set points. The graphical form in 
Figure 14 is known as a polar star; when the current valve positions deviate from the set 
points, the outlined shape becomes distorted. The saliency of changes in the polar star 
 41
graphic supports skill-based behaviour and as a result enables operators to devote more 
cognitive resources to other tasks. Due to implementation restrictions with the current 
HMI design tool (Picasso), the polar star graphic was redesigned and replaced with the 
graphical form shown in Figure 15. Note that there are four primary high-pressure turbine 
control valves (VA1, VA2, VB1, VB2), which are connected via lines to indicate the 
variables’ relationship, i.e. valve positions should be identical. The connecting lines are 
another example of an emergent feature. The governor support system is also responsible 
for sending the appropriate signals to the valves for opening and closing; the signals are 
represented by positive and negative bars located below the valve position grid. The 
signal sent to a particular valve should reflect the direction in which it is moving, e.g. a 











Figure 16: Turbine Speed Graphic at 















Figure 17: Generator Output Graphic at 
Functional Purpose Level 
 
 Turbine control valves, which regulate steam pressure and flow, directly control 
turbine speed (Figure 16) during generator run-up and while the system is under load or 
operating under normal conditions. In turn, turbine speed affects generator torque and as 
such increases or decreases electrical power output (Figure 17). Similar to the reactor 
pressure graphical form, turbine speed is displayed as a trend with maximum and 
minimum limits. 
Since the dimensions of electrical power are related in a simple mathematical 
fashion, the graphical form is based on its common geometric representation known as 
the power triangle. Adopting familiar graphical forms effectively promotes knowledge-
based behaviour. Variables visualized in Figure 17 include real power, reactive power, 
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apparent power, and power factor. Power generation is constrained by the capabilities of 
the generator and is shown in the graphical form as a shaded background triangle, i.e. the 
power triangle should remain within this background shape. In the event that reactive 
power becomes capacitive (negative), in which case reactive power is flowing into the 
turbine system, the power triangle flips vertically to increase saliency. Apparent or total 
power is a product of the voltage and current leaving the generator, but is typically 
calculated from real and reactive power values. Operators may need to individually adjust 
real and reactive power output based on consumer demands. Utility companies often base 
rates on both real and reactive power consumption. The efficiency of power consumption 
is determined by the power factor variable, which is calculated by observing the ratio 
between real power and apparent power. 
 
3.3.2.2 Design at the Abstract Function Level 
 
Variables extracted at the Abstract Function level are related to balances and flows in the 
system; mass and energy variables are of particular interest in the turbine system. 
Although nuclear power plant operators do not traditionally refer to mass and energy 
flow information, the EID framework aims to present all relevant work environment 
constraints found in the underlying system. Doing so allows operators to monitor the 
system from a top-down perspective and identify out of bounds conditions even if the 
fault is unfamiliar and unanticipated (Vicente, 1999a). Faults in the system result from 
one or more violations in the constraints. In effect, the overall consequences of a low-
level (equipment) fault are made apparent in EID information displays. 
To achieve the goals specified at the Functional Purpose level, overall mass 
movement between systems must be balanced. According to the law of conservation of 
mass, the mass flow into a system must equal the mass flow out. The relationship was 
illustrated with mass balance bars as shown in Figure 18 and is accentuated by the 
emergent features located between the bars: a horizontal line and a bubble. The mass 
balance bars are divided in a manner to show flow destinations. When the system is 
operating within work environment constraints, the two bars are equal in height and the 
horizontal line is flat. Should mass flow become uneven, e.g. leakage, the horizontal line 
 43
will tilt and the bubble will slide upwards along the line. The bubble graphical element is 
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Figure 18: Mass Balance Graphic at Abstract Function Level 
 
At the same time, it is vital that energy flow through the system remains within 
physical constraints as dictated by the first and second laws of thermodynamics. Steam 
energy is represented by enthalpy or heat content and varies across the turbine system 
based on the processes described at the Generalized Function level. Nuclear power plant 
control room operators are typically trained to use fundamental thermodynamic tools 
such as steam tables and Mollier diagrams to solve complex process related problems 
(Ontario Power Generation, 1988). However, such tools are often only available in 
hardcopy format and not integrated into the monitoring system. In applying the SRK 
framework, it is at times best to adapt existing visual representations of complex 
relationships to develop knowledge-based behaviour. The Mollier diagram in Figure 19 
illustrates the expected changes in energy as steam flows through the system. The shape 
formed by the connecting lines offers a visualisation of the energy flow and more 
importantly a pattern that operators can recognise over time. Unfortunately, there are no 
practical means for measuring or calculating entropy (x-axis) in existing nuclear power 
plants. By adapting the Mollier diagram into a horizontal enthalpy profile, it was possible 
to retain the general shape and pattern of the flow (see Figure 20). Note that entropy is an 
ever-increasing value in a system and for the purposes of visualisation (i.e. not precise 
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Figure 20: Energy Flow Profile at Abstract Function Level 
 
3.3.2.3 Design at the Generalized Function Level 
 
On the steam side of the turbine system, variables found at the Generalized Function 
level were associated with steam temperature and pressure. Similar to enthalpy at the 
Abstract Function level, temperature and pressure are related to one another through a 
sequence of processes. It was therefore possible to integrate horizontal temperature and 
pressure profiles (see Figure 21) with the enthalpy profile. Again, pattern recognition 
may be used by operators over time to detect changes in the system, but additional 
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graphical features were included since temperature and pressure constraints differ along 
the measurement points. Expected temperature and pressure values based on the current 
reactor load (i.e. electrical power generation set point) are represented with blue 
diamonds, which are consistent with the set point indicators in the valve position display. 
Current values, shown as white dots, are monitored to determine deviations from the set 
points. Alarm thresholds for each of the variables warn of approaching maximum or 
minimum limits via existing severity colours: yellow (low) and red (high). 
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Figure 21: Temperature and Pressure Profiles at Abstract Function Level 
 
 On the electrical side of the turbine system, variables found at the Generalized 
Function level are related to the generation and transmission processes of electrical 
energy. The graphical form depicted in Figure 23 is intended to replace an indicator 
known as a synchroscope (see Figure 22) for the process of grid synchronisation. The 
breaker is closed to connect the generator and the grid when both sides have equal 
voltage magnitude, frequency, and phase. In a traditional synchroscope, operators are 
required to remember how each variable is mapped to the dial, e.g. position, direction, 
speed (for full details refer to Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 2003). To lessen the 
cognitive load on the operators during the synchronisation process, the differences 
between the variables were visualized. Voltages were portrayed as sinusoidal waves; 
when the generator-side sinusoidal wave (dark grey) matches the grid-side sinusoidal 
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wave (light grey), the system is synchronized. For saliency, the peaks of the waves were 
marked with white dots and blue diamonds, which were consistent with the other 
graphical forms designed for the system. Specific differences in the voltage magnitude, 




Figure 22: Traditional Sychroscope Indicator 












Figure 23: Grid Synchronisation Graphic 













Figure 24: Voltage Conversion Graphic at Generalized Function Level 
 
 The voltage conversion process carried out by transformers is typically monitored 
through digital or independent values without reference to constraints. The variables 
involved in the process are related by a set transformer ratio value, which can be 
represented by a simple geometric shape (parallelogram) as shown in Figure 24. A step-
up in voltage should result in a current reduction by the same amount based on the set 
transformer ratio. Voltage values are shown in the upper half of the graphical form, while 
amperage (current) values are shown in the lower half on a positive increasing vertical 
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scale. Note that the right vertical axis uses a logarithmic scale to account for the large 
step-up ratio. Again, the primary purpose of the graphic is to reduce the amount of mental 
calculations involved to determine whether the voltage and current values are within 
constraints. 
 
3.3.2.4 Design at the Physical Function and Physical Form Levels 
 
Equipment-relevant information such as capacity, size, and location are extracted from 
the Physical Function and Physical Form levels. Tanks identified in the part-whole 
decomposition analysis are constrained by maximum and minimum limits. Although the 
design of the displays underwent several iterations, the graphical forms characterising the 
tanks remained relatively constant (see Figure 25). The tank level traces behaved 
similarly to the reactor pressure trace (see Figure 13) described at the Functional Purpose 
level. The left side of the graphic displays the history of the water level in meters, but at a 
higher resolution, i.e. enlarged light grey portion of the right side. The right side of the 
graphic displays the current value of the variable as well as the alarm thresholds and 
capacity limits. Compact versions of the tank graphical forms were integrated into the 
























Figure 25: Tank Graphics at Physical Function Level 
 
The turbine system consists of a high-pressure turbine and three low-pressure 
turbines, which contribute largely to the processes described at the Generalized Function 
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level, but are at the same time constrained by physical equipment limitations such as 
vibration described at the Physical Function level. The two vertical bars inside the turbine 
shape of the turbine vibration graphic (see Figure 26) are a visual indication of the 
maximum value; if the middle vertical black bar deviates or rotates too much, it will 
touch the two surrounding constraint bars. Under normal conditions, the middle bar is in 
the vertical position at or near the minimum value. Slight deviations to turbine vibration 
become apparent due to the two static constraint bars, which act as a reference and 
contribute to the graphic’s emergent properties. It is important to note that some of the 
variables extracted at the Physical Function level are identical to others found at higher 








Figure 26: Turbine Vibration Graphic at Physical Function Level 
 
 As stated earlier, the AH analysis did not elaborate on the Physical Form details 
(equipment attributes, e.g. size, colour) found in plant literature for practical reasons. 
Much of the low-level information is available to operators in hardcopy format. Though it 
is not currently feasible to include such information in the simulator, the relative location 
of specific pieces of equipment can be approximated and visualized via mimic graphics. 
P&ID diagrams, part-whole models, and existing mimic displays (see Appendix A) were 
referenced and incorporated into the EID information displays; equipment was labelled 
accordingly. Some Physical Function graphics such as tanks and turbines were integrated 
into the mimic displays for conciseness. When operators interact with the mimic 
graphics, additional information regarding equipment state extracted at the Physical 
Function level becomes available. Operators may also remotely control certain pieces of 
equipment, in particular valves (e.g. open, close). However, all possible equipment 
actions were inherited from the existing mimic displays and were not examined in the 
EID analysis. The design of the EID information displays did not concentrate on controls, 
which were omitted from the system boundary. 
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3.3.3 Graphical Organisation 
 
Graphical forms representing single and multiple variables were designed primarily in a 
manner to promote skill-based behaviour described in the SRK framework. In order to 
better support knowledge-based behaviour, the graphical forms designed in the above 
subsection were arranged based on the abstraction levels, i.e. embedding an AH 
representation of the system in the display (Vicente, 1999a; Burns, 2000). Variables 
derived at the Functional Purpose level such as reactor pressure and turbine control valve 
positions were placed in the upper portion of the display reflecting their actual positions 
in the hierarchy. Given that operators tend to visually scan items vertically from top to 
bottom in a supervisory control environment, it is also reasonable to arrange graphical 
elements representing the goals of the system near the top of the display (Wickens & 
Hollands, 2000). The balance, flow, and process variables were grouped by abstraction 
level and distributed throughout the mid-lower portion of the display. The mimic 
graphics were integrated with the higher abstraction graphics to facilitate means-ends 
visualisation. The integration of graphical forms from various levels has been shown to 
improve fault diagnosis times and accuracy (Burns, 2000). Equipment details at the 
Physical Form level including controls were made available on the left panel as a 
secondary display, e.g. valve information and controls appear on the left panel when a 
valve is selected in the main display. 
 The resulting EID information displays for the turbine secondary systems are 
shown in Figures 27 (main steam subsystem), 28 (steam reheat subsystem), and 29 
(generator subsystem). The colours of the graphical forms were normalized across the 
three secondary systems to conform to the grey backdrop. Information displays utilising 
greyscale are known to improve salience of important graphical features (Burns & 
Hajdukiewicz, 2004). Graphical details such as line thickness, font type, and font size 
were also standardized for consistency. The displays were implemented using an in-house 
































Figure 29: Generator Subsystem Display in the Turbine System 
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based on participant feedback as part of the iterative design process similar to other 
design approaches. The pre-pilot EID information displays for the turbine secondary 
systems are available for reference in Appendix E. The finalized post-pilot EID 
information displays for each of the secondary systems can be found in Appendix F; the 
displays were implemented in the HAMMLAB Forsmark 3 simulator and evaluated with 





Methodology for Evaluating Ecological Interface 
Design and Situation Awareness 
 
A comparative experiment was designed and subsequently conducted to evaluate the 
Ecological Interface Design (EID) information displays for the Forsmark 3 boiling water 
reactor nuclear power plant. Operator situation awareness (SA) and performance are of 
specific interest to the Halden Reactor Project (HRP). This thesis focuses primarily on 
measuring and comparing SA between the EID and existing mimic displays. Given the 
project’s limited access to licensed operator participants from the Forsmark 3 plant, a 
number of experimental designs were examined via a power analysis for suitability. A 
pilot experiment was also carried out to verify the methodology. This chapter describes 




Participants for the experiment were recruited from the Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor 
nuclear power plant located in Sweden. The power plant licensee is a member of the 
Halden Reactor Project (HRP). A total of six (n = 6) licensed control room operating 
crews with roles ranging from supervision to reactor operation agreed to participate on a 
voluntary basis. Each crew consisted of one reactor operator (RO) and one turbine 
operator (TO). The study examines the role of the TO in particular, but crew is 
considered to be representative of a single working unit despite the absence of a shift 
supervisor (SS) found in a typical control room operating crew. Two additional operators 
were recruited for the pilot study. See Appendix I for complete materials concerning 
ethics, recruitment procedures, and scheduling. 
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4.2 Experimental Environment 
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the experiment was conducted at the Halden Man-Machine 
Laboratory (HAMMLAB). The HAMMLAB control room environment contains three 
workstations and a large-screen display as shown in Figure 30. The workstations transmit 
and receive data from one of three plant simulators: Forsmark 3, Fessenheim, and 
Oseberg Øst. The data is presented to the operators at each workstation through interfaces 
on 19” LCD panels. Navigation and interaction through the interfaces is done via 
keyboard and mouse. A typical control room experiment involves one reactor operator, 
one turbine operator, and one shift supervisor. In this particular experiment, the various 
interfaces and scenarios were evaluated with one reactor operator and one turbine 
operator. Each operator workstation is made up of 12 individual LCD panels. See 
Appendix H for complete details on screen set-up and organisation. The large-screen 
display in the middle of the room provides an overview of the plant for both operators. 
Located behind the control room environment shown in Figure 31 is an observation 
gallery from which the experimental team manages the simulator, scenarios, and data 
collection. Operator interactions with the interfaces are logged in the simulator while 




Figure 30: HAMMLAB Control Room Layout 
 
 
Figure 31: HAMMLAB Observation Gallery 
 
 The experimental team consisted of an experimental leader, a process expert, a 
laboratory technician, and a training team. The leader was responsible for overseeing the 
scenario progression, acting as a representative from plant management in order to 
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evaluate operator response, and administering the appropriate questionnaires. The process 
expert managed the simulator functions, acted as plant and engineering personnel, 
provided comments on the current state of the scenario. The laboratory technician 
handled all data recorded through the simulator, including questionnaires, and audio-
visual equipment. See Section 4.6 for more details concerning experimental procedures 
such as training and run plan. 
 
4.3 Experimental Design 
 
To determine to what degree EID supports situation awareness, it is necessary to perform 
a comparative evaluation given that no industry benchmarks exist. In an ongoing man-
machine systems project, the HRP is developing advanced displays primarily through a 
user-centred design (UCD) approach based on existing hardwired mimic displays in 
existing control rooms. Traditional mimic and advanced UCD displays for the Forsmark 
3 nuclear power plant were evaluated alongside the EID information displays. In addition 
to examining operator situation awareness between the interfaces, potential differences 
from anticipated and unanticipated scenario types as well as scenario periods were 
investigated. Table 2 and 3 summarize the independent and dependent variables for this 
particular study.  
The independent variables in this experiment were selected in order to investigate 
potential scenario effects on the different types of interfaces. Prior research suggests that 
EID information displays provide support for operator performance in unfamiliar and 
unanticipated scenarios (Vicente, 1999a). Furthermore, the EID approach directly 
supports fault detection and mitigation through visualisation techniques based on the 
SRK framework. The dependent variables include a variety of measures of interest of the 
HRP project as a whole. However, this thesis concentrates foremost on variables related 
to SA: SACRI, HOPE, and Self-Rated Bias. See Section 4.4 for hypotheses concerning 
the effects of interface type and scenario factors on operator SA. 
A 3x2x2 within-subjects randomized block factorial (RBF-322) design, also 
known as a 3-way repeated measures design, was initially applied to the study. A within-
subjects design was selected to control variances in factors such as learning between 
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operators. Furthermore, it allowed for limited (participant) resources to be employed in a 
manner that would yield conclusive results. See Section 4.5 for details concerning the 
power analysis conducted for this particular experimental design. A total of twelve (12) 
conditions were examined, i.e. crossing all independent variables. Because participants 
are evaluated for multiple conditions, it is important to counterbalance or randomize the 
presentation order. Counterbalancing prevents order effects such as learning or fatigue, 
which may confound the dependent measures. Given the small sample size of the study, it 
was not possible to perform complete counterbalancing via a repeated measures design in 
which participants are evaluated for all condition permutations. An incomplete balanced 
Latin square counterbalancing technique was employed to evenly distribute conditions 
among the participants; this approach compensates order and carry-over (sequential) 
effects. 
 
Table 2: Independent Variables 
Interface Type (A) a1: Ecological Interface Design (Appendix F) 
a2: Advanced User Centred Design (Appendix A) 
a3: Traditional Single Sensor-Single Indicator 
Scenario Type (B) b1: Anticipated Scenario 
b2: Unanticipated Scenario 
Scenario Period (c) c1: Detection Phase 
c2: Mitigation Phase 
 
 
Table 3: Dependent Variables 
SACRI • Situation Awareness Control Room Inventory based 
on SAGAT and SDT (see Chapter 2) 
• Post-experiment scoring via simulator log comparison 
replaced with concurrent scoring performed by 
process expert during scenario breaks. 
• Modification avoids need to reconstruct events thus 
streamlining scoring process. 
HOPE • Halden Open Probe Elicitation (see Chapter 2) 
OPAS • Operator Performance Assessment System (Skraaning, 
1998, 2003) 
Self-Ratings • Self-Rated Bias (Situation Awareness) 
• Self-Rated Task Complexity (Workload) 
• Self-Rated Operator Performance 
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 In designing the Latin square, only the independent variables that have the 
potential to confound results through order effects were counterbalanced. Combinations 
of interface type and scenario type variables formed six conditions: a1b1, a1b2, a2b1, a2b2, 
a3b1, and a3b2. Scenario period was excluded from the Latin square design, as the detection 
phase always preceded the mitigation phase. The six conditions were systematically 
randomized in a 6x6 square made up of six crews and six scenario runs. In essence, each 
crew is assigned a different condition presentation order. See Table 8 in Section 4.6 for 
the resulting run plan. For each scenario type (anticipated, unanticipated), three different 
versions were designed and randomly distributed within the run plan. Table 4 below gives 
a general description of each scenario used in the experiment. 
 
Table 4: Scenario Descriptions 
Scenario Type Version Description 
1 Leak in intermediate super heater (422EA1) causes high-
pressure steam to flow to low-pressure turbines. 
2 Malfunction in drain valve (463VA20) prevents water 
from draining to the condenser. 
Anticipated (b1) 
3 Malfunction in level regulating valve (463VB21) causes 
excessive drain flow. 
1 Turbine trip due to malfunction in drain valve (422VB6) 
with the generator still connected to the grid. 
2 Leak in condensate cleaning building (KRA332) due to 
malfunction in drain valve (332VB2). 
Unanticipated (b2) 
3 High seawater temperature causes an increase in pressure 




To test the overall main and interaction effects of the variables described above, the 
experiment employed non-directional hypotheses (Skraaning Jr., Nihlwing, Welch, & 
Veland, 2005a). However, directional expectations were examined post-experimentally 
through contrast analyses. It should be noted that this thesis concentrates mainly on the 
effects of interface type and scenario type. The effects of scenario period are not 
hypothesized, but discussed separately. Refer to Table 2 for designated treatment level 
symbols and Table 5 for a summary of the hypotheses in symbolic form. 
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Hypothesis for main effect of interface type (A): Results from existing empirical 
studies (Vicente, 2002) suggest performance advantages of EID information displays 
over traditional interfaces designed primarily through the Single Sensor-Single Indicator 
(SS-SI) approach (Goodstein, 1981). Comparisons of EID information displays to 
advanced interfaces designed with other progressive methodologies such as Task-Based 
and UCD have also yielded EID performance gains (Burns and Hajdukiewicz, 2004). 
Although there have been no prior studies examining the effects of the EID approach on 
operator SA, similar results are expected. It is hypothesized that a significant difference 
exists between mean SA scores (m) in the different treatment levels. In particular, mean 
SA scores for the EID interface type will be significantly greater than mean SA scores for 
the Advanced UCD and Traditional SS-SI interface types. 
 Hypothesis for main effect of scenario type (B): Investigations into past incidents 
in the process control domain have revealed that system safety is often compromised by 
operators’ inability to adapt to new and unfamiliar situations (Vicente & Rasmussen, 
1992). Such situations are also known as beyond-design-basis or unanticipated events; 
events that interfaces and training programs cannot be specifically designed to support. 
Again, although there have been no prior studies examining the effects of unanticipated 
events on operator SA, similar results are expected. It is hypothesized that a significant 
difference exists between mean SA scores (m) in the different treatment levels. In 
particular, mean SA scores for anticipated scenarios will be significantly greater than 
mean SA scores for unanticipated scenarios. 
 Hypothesis for interaction effect between interface type (A) and scenario type 
(B): EID information displays have been shown to improve operator performance in 
unanticipated events (Vicente, 1999a). The results have been replicated in a 
representative industrial environment, i.e. full-scope simulator study with professional 
participants (Jamieson, 2002). EID aims to support beyond-design-basis events by 
making information relevant to event detection and problem solving visible to the 
operator. It is hypothesized that a significant different exists between mean SA scores (m) 
for some treatment combination, i.e. A x B. Because within-design-basis or anticipated 
events are typically directly supported in process control systems, no significant 
difference in operator SA is expected between the interfaces. Given that the EID 
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information displays are designed to directly support knowledge-based processing under 
all event types, it is hypothesized that the mean SA score is significantly higher. However, 
if the Advanced User Centred Design (UCD) information displays provide similar 
support for specific unanticipated events, the mean SA score will be comparable to that 
of the EID information displays and greater than that of the Traditional SS-SI information 
displays. Likewise, if the Advanced UCD information displays do not adequately support 
unanticipated events, the mean SA score will be significantly less than that of the EID 
information displays and equal to that of the Traditional SS-SI information displays. 
 
Table 5: Summary of Hypotheses 
Interface Type (A) H0: ma1 = ma2 = ma3  
H1: mi ≠ mj for some i and j  (non-directional) 
H1: ma1 > ma2 > ma3 (directional) 
Scenario Type (B) H0: mb1 = mb2  
H1: mb1 ≠ mb2 (non-directional) 
H1: mb1 > mb2 (directional) 
Interface Type (A) x 
Scenario Type (B) 
H0: mij - mi’j - mij’ - mi’j’ = 0 for all treatment combinations 
H1: mij - mi’j - mij’ - mi’j’ ≠ 0 (non-directional) 
H1: ma1b1 = ma2b1 = ma3b1 > ma1b2 ≥ ma2b2 ≥ ma3b2 (directional) 
 
4.5 Power Analysis 
 
A power analysis was carried out by a team of experts (Skraaning Jr., Nihlwing, Welch, 
& Veland, 2005a) to estimate the probability that the proposed experimental design 
would produce statistically significant results. Specifically, power was estimated for the 
main effects of interface type (A), scenarios type (B), and scenario period (C) produced 
by the within-subjects RBF-322 design. Calculations were performed using the Power 
Analysis and Sample Size (PASS) software (Hintze, 1994). Parameters required and 
assumptions made for the analysis are described below. 
Power is determined by several factors, namely: alpha (α) level, sample size (n), 
and effect size (f, ω2). The levels of statistical significance are α = 0.05 (moderate 
evidence against H0) and α = 0.10 (suggestive evidence against H0). The p-value 
approach is employed with the convention indicated in Table 6. As previously noted, the 
hypotheses are assumed to be non-directional and thus two-tailed significance tests are 
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used. The population correlation coefficient among treatment combinations, i.e. degree of 
association between all treatments, is assumed to be ρ = 0.25 (moderate estimate) based 
on previous HAMMLAB studies. A sample size of  n = 6 was used in the calculations, 
reflecting the limited number of participants. Power was estimated for three effect sizes 
or degree to which null hypothesis is false: medium (f = 0.25, ω2 = 0.059), typical (f = 
0.33, ω2 = 0.10), and large (f = 0.40, ω2 = 0.138). In this case, f is a measure of difference 
and ω2 is a measure of association. A medium effect size is characterized by differences 
noticeable through careful observation, while a large effect size is immediately apparent 
(Cohen, 1992). A typical effect size refers to experimental effects that are generally 
reported in the field of behavioural science (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000).  
 
Table 6: P-Value Interpretations for Power Analysis 
p-value Interpretation 
p < 0.01 Very strong evidence against H0. 
0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 Moderate evidence against H0. 
0.05 ≤ p < 0.10 Suggestive evidence against H0. 
p ≥ 0.10 Little or no evidence against H0. 
 
Table 7: Power Estimates for RBF-322 (Skraaning Jr., 
Nihlwing, Welch, & Veland, 2005a) 
RBF-322 Large Effects Typical Effects Medium Effects 
 α = 0.05 α = 0.10 α = 0.05 α = 0.10 α = 0.05 α = 0.10 
Interface Type 0.94 0.98 0.82 0.91 0.51 0.72 
Interface Type (GG-HF) 0.91 0.97 0.77 0.89 0.51 0.69 
Interface Type (Multivariate) 0.67 0.84 0.51 0.70 0.32 0.50 
Scenario Type   0.94  0.99 0.84 0.94 0.63 0.79 
Scenario Period 0.94 0.99  0.84 0.94 0.63 0.79 
 
The resulting power estimates are provided in Table 7. In general, an 
experimental design yields significant effects when power is estimated to be at least 0.80; 
these values are italicised. It can be concluded from Table 7 that the proposed RBF-322 
experimental design with sample size of n = 6 has sufficient statistical power to reveal 
typical and large effects. For medium effects, there may be suggestive evidence against 
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H0 given that the power estimates are close to 0.80. The Greenhouse-Geisser/Huynh-
Feldt adjustment and multivariate approach to repeated measures were included for the 
interface type (A) treatment. However, the Greenhouse-Geisser/Huynh-Feldt adjustment 




Due to the nature of the experiment, i.e. involving human participants, the proposed study 
and recruitment process were first cleared by three separate ethics committees (one from 
each participating institution): Office of Research Ethics (University of Waterloo), Ethics 
Review Office (University of Toronto), and Human Studies Review Committee (IFE). 
Recruitment and scheduling materials submitted to the ethics boards are provided in 
Appendix I.  
A total of six crews consisting of a reactor operator and a turbine operator were 
invited to participate in the study. The experiment was conducted over a span of three 
weeks, i.e. two crews per week. Each week comprised of three days of training and 
evaluation. A one-day training session at the start of the week was held to familiarize the 
operators with the HAMMLAB facilities, the Forsmark 3 simulator, and the information 
displays. A background demographics questionnaire was also distributed during the 
training session. Scenario trial sessions were held in the following two days of the week. 
Table 8 details the overall run plan of the experiment based on the design described in the 
preceding sections. Each crew was assigned to six different scenario-interface 
combinations, which were presented in random order. Refer to Table 2 for designated 
treatment combination symbols. Numbers shown in brackets represent the scenario 
version for the corresponding scenario type as described in Table 4. To prevent fatigue, 
each crew was limited to three scenarios per day. For a daily run down of activities, refer 
to Appendix I. 
 Following the measurement strategies outlined in existing SACRI and HOPE 
literature, questionnaires and probes were administered at random time intervals during 
each scenario. Specifically, two pauses are made per scenario during which the screens 
are blanked and the operators are asked to fill out a questionnaire, i.e. SACRI and self-
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rating. The first pause is made sometime during the detection phase while the second 
pause is made after the mitigation phase. During the pause in the detection phase, 
operators answered 4 self-rating questions and between 9 to 12 SACRI queries. During 
the pause in the mitigation phase, operators answered 8 self-rating questions and 12 
SACRI queries. Similar simulator pauses without screen blanking are made throughout 
the scenario during which the experimental leader probes an operator’s SA through 
telephone conversation, i.e. HOPE. A total of four HOPE queries were made per 
scenario: (1) during detection phase, (2) immediately after detection phase, (3) during 
mitigation phase, and (4) immediately after mitigation phase. A debriefing session was 
held upon the completion of all scenarios to gather other potentially helpful information 
such as user satisfaction. Refer to Appendix J for a compilation of questionnaires used in 
the experiment. As previously mentioned, data relevant to the hypotheses were primarily 
collected through the simulator and audio-visual instruments. The analysis and results of 
the data are detailed in the following chapter. 
 
Table 8: Experiment Run Plan (Skraaning Jr., Nihlwing, Welch, & Veland, 2005a) 
 Run Order 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Crew 1 a1 b1 (2) a3 b2 (2) a2 b2 (3) a1 b2 (3) a3 b1 (1) a2 b1 (1) 
Crew 2 a2 b1 (2) a1 b1 (1) a3 b2 (3) a2 b2 (2) a1 b2 (1) a3 b1 (3) 
Crew 3 a3 b1 (3) a2 b1 (2) a1 b1 (2) a3 b2 (1) a2 b2 (3) a1 b2 (1) 
Crew 4 a1 b2 (1) a3 b1 (3) a2 b1 (3) a1 b1 (1) a3 b2 (2) a2 b2 (2) 
Crew 5 a2 b2 (3) a1 b2 (2) a3 b1 (1) a2 b1 (3) a1 b1 (2) a3 b2 (1) 







Data Analysis and Results 
 
This chapter provides the results of the statistical analyses carried out on the data 
collected in the comparative experiment. Non-directional (two-tailed) tests were 
employed. Particular attention is given to data relevant to the proposed hypotheses 
described in Chapter 4, i.e. self-rating bias, Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE), and 
Situation Awareness Control Room Inventory (SACRI). The preliminary results suggest 
that no significant differences in operator situation awareness (SA) exist between the 
three information displays. However, several interaction effects were found between the 
three independent variables. In particular, SACRI sensitivity scores for the different 
interfaces were found to depend on scenario type. The HOPE and SACRI measures also 
suggested differences in operator SA while proceeding from the detection phase to the 




A total of six (6) licensed control room operating crews were recruited from the Forsmark 
3 boiling water reactor plant in Sweden. A typical control room crew consists of one 
reactor operator (RO), one turbine operator (TO), and one shift supervisor (SS). 
However, due to the Halden Reactor Project’s limited access to qualified individuals, a 
SS was not included in the crews. The demographic details gathered from the background 
questionnaire of the twelve (12) participants are given in Table 5.1. Refer to Appendix 
I.B for a copy of the background questionnaire. Due to unforeseen circumstances, two (2) 
of the participants scheduled to act as reactor operators for the experiment were unable to 
attend. Replacing the absentees with participants from other crews was considered to be 
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the least intrusive option given that the complete removal of two crews from the 
experiment would alter the power of the results significantly. Specifically, participants 1 
and 5 acted in place of participants 3 and 7 (shown in Table 9), respectively.  
 
Table 9: Demographics Results 





TO RO SS 
1 RO SS 0 59 M N / 5 Y / 3 Y / 13 
2 TO TO / RO 1 53 M Y / 10 Y / 5 N / 0 
3 RO SS 0 59 M N / 5 Y / 3 Y / 13 
4 TO RO / Shift Eng. 3 44 M N / 0 Y / 14 Y / 0 
5 RO SS 5 46 M N / 2 Y / 14 Y / 9 
6 TO RO 0 38 M N / 5 Y / 5 Y / 2 
7 RO SS 5 46 M N / 0 Y / 14 Y / 9 
8 TO TO 2 37 M Y / 3 N / 0 N / 0 
9 RO RO / SS 2 47 M N / 5 Y / 10 Y / 2 
10 TO Other 0 48 M N / 0 N / 0 N / 0 
11 RO RO/ Shift Eng. 2 46 M N / 15 Y / 8 Y / 3 
12 TO TO / RO 0 39 F Y / 2.5 Y / 0.5 N / 0 
Mean 1.50 45.7 9M, 1F 3 / 4.75 8 / 5.95 6 / 2.9 
Standard Deviation 1.65 6.83  4.64 5.39 4.51 
 
 A majority of the operators have prior experience with the HAMMLAB simulator 
and facilities; overall average of 1.5 years of involvement with the HRP. The mean age of 
the participants was 45.7 with a standard deviation of 6.83. Of the ten (10) unique 
participants, less than half possessed a turbine operator license, while a majority held a 
reactor operator license. As per regulatory guidelines, licenses require continual renewal 
in order to be valid. Half of the operators are former turbine operators and no longer 
possess a valid turbine operator license. The mean number of years of experience in each 
of the positions relevant to the study: 4.75 (TO), 5.95 (RO), and 2.9 (SS). It should be 
noted that participant 10 has no prior official control room operating experience, but has 
extensive experience as a field operator and control room instructor.  
 
5.2 Self-Rated Bias 
 
A self-rating questionnaire was administered to the operators during the detection and 
mitigation phases in each scenario, i.e. during the same scenario breaks required for the 
SACRI measure. Similar to the HOPE measure, self-rated bias attempts to subjectively 
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assess SA. However, self-rated bias as applied in this study directly probes operator SA, 
whereas HOPE relies on expert evaluators to indirectly score SA based on operator 
response to open verbal queries. Refer to Appendix J for a copy of the self-rating bias 
questionnaire. Participants rate themselves on a scale of 1 to 5 for each question, of 
which two directly measure SA: (1) I had a good overview of the process, and (2) I 
became aware of process deviations at an early stage. The ratings from the two questions 
translate roughly to an overall SA score, where a score of 1 is representative of poor SA 
and 5 is of perfect SA. The following analysis exclusively examines the self-ratings 
extracted from the two SA-relevant questions by turbine operators. 
 
Table 10: Self-Rated Bias Summary 
Interface Type Scenario Type Scenario Period  
a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 c1 c2 
Mean 3.287 3.318 3.089 3.254 3.208 3.340 3.123 
Standard Deviation 0.5857 0.5793 0.7047 0.5554 0.6957 0.6385 0.6010 
Maximum 4.25 4.00 4.50 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.00 
Minimum 2.00 1.75 1.75 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 
 
Table 11: Self-Rated Bias ANOVA 
Effect SS df Mean Square F p 
Interface Type (A) 0.741 1.611 0.460 1.070 0.371 
Scenario Type (B) 0.037 1 0.037 0.730 0.432 
Scenario Period (C) 0.861 1 0.861 3.830 0.108 
AxB 0.189 1.507 0.126 0.430 0.612 
AxC 0.880 1.185 0.743 1.476 0.280 
BxC 0.521 1 0.521 3.755 0.110 
AxBxC 1.616 1.451 1.114 2.721 0.137 
 
A summary of self-rated bias categorized by interface type (A), scenario type (B), 
and scenario period (C) is provided in Table 10 and Figure 32. An analysis was 
performed to determine the main effects of the three independent variables. The 
interaction effects among the independent variables were also examined. The results of a 
3-way repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections where appropriate are shown in Table 11. Residual plots of the data indicate 
that the assumptions of constant variance among groups and normality in each 
combination hold. No significant main effects or interactions were found, p > 0.10 for all 
conditions. Self-rated bias appears to average around 3 (on a scale of 1 to 5) regardless of 
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treatment, which is representative of moderate operator SA. Essentially, there is no 
evidence that interface type (A), scenario type (B), and scenario period (C) have any 
effect on an operator’s self-rated bias, i.e. SA is neither improved nor degraded.  
 
Figure 32: Mean Self-Rated Bias 
 
5.3 Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE) 
 
As described previously in Chapter 2, the Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE) 
measure assesses operator SA on a scale known as operator Level of Understanding 
(LoU). The LoU score for an operator is determine by an expert observer acting as a 
representative from plant management via a series of queries or open probes. Recall that 
the measure was administered by telephone. Refer to Appendix G for a description of the 
LoU scale and Appendix J for HOPE query timelines per scenario and condition probes. 
A total of four probes were made per scenario: (1) during detection phase, (2) 
immediately after detection phase, (3) during mitigation phase, and (4) immediately after 
mitigation phase. The exact span of time in between each probe depends on the scenario; 
however, the four probes always occur in succession.  
A summary of turbine operator HOPE LoU scores categorized by interface type 
(A), scenario type (B), and scenario period (C) is provided in Table 12 and Figure 33. A 
maximum score of 3 (full understanding) and a minimum score of 1 (poor understanding) 
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was given for all variable levels. An analysis was performed to determine the main 
effects of the three variables as well as possible interaction effects. The results of a 3-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections where appropriate are 
shown in Table 13. Residual plots of the data show that the assumptions of constant 
variance among groups and normality in each combination hold. 
 
Table 12: HOPE Level of Understanding Summary 
Interface Type Scenario Type Scenario Period  
a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 1 2 3 4 
Mean 1.380 1.210 1.350 1.320 1.310 0.670 1.220 1.780 1.580 
Standard Deviation 1.003 0.922 1.082 0.976 1.030 0.986 1.124 0.722 0.770 
Maximum 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Figure 33: Mean HOPE Level of Understanding 
 
 No main effects or interactions were found for the interface type (A) and scenario 
type (B) conditions, p > 0.10 for all combinations. Operators under all interface and 
scenario type treatments yielded similar mean LoU scores of approximately 1.3 points 
(on a scale of 0 to 3), which corresponds to some understanding of the situation or SA. 
There is strong evidence that a difference in LoU scores exists over time, from the 
detection phase to the mitigation phase [F(2.137, 10.686) = 10.91, p = 0.002]. A general 
increase in the scores with a slight drop after the mitigation phase can be seen in Figure 
33. A pre-planned polynomial contrast of scenario period (C) revealed a quadratic effect 
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over time [F(1, 5) = 20.593, p = 0.006]. The drop in LoU at the end of each scenario 
occurs in a consistent manner across all conditions. However, there was no evidence of 
interaction effects with time.  
A separate analysis averaging the two detection phase scores (probes 1 and 2) and 
the two mitigation phase scores (probes 3 and 4) was conducted to determine if an overall 
difference in LoU existed between the two phases. Again, strong evidence was found 
indicating a significant increase in LoU scores when operators are proceeding from the 
detection phase to the mitigation phase. A general mean increase of 0.736 points was 
observed; it is often enough to raise an operator’s understanding of a situation by a level 
based on the HOPE LoU scale. In this case, an operator acquires some SA in the 
detection phase and gains a level of understanding equivalent to good SA in the 
mitigation phase. 
 
Table 13: HOPE Level of Understanding ANOVA 
Effect SS df Mean Square F p 
Interface Type (A) 0.792 2 0.396 0.397 0.682 
Scenario Type (B) 0.007 1 0.007 0.031 0.867 
Scenario Period (C) 25.74 2.137 12.05 10.91 0.002 
AxB 5.681 1.095 5.186 1.530 0.271 
AxC 4.986 2.608 1.912 1.210 0.340 
BxC 0.910 1.316 0.691 0.435 0.586 
AxBxC 2.986 1.936 1.543 1.923 0.198 
 
 
5.4 Situation Awareness Control Room Inventory (SACRI) 
 
The Situation Awareness Control Room Inventory (SACRI) measure attempts to directly 
assess SA based on operator accuracy in detecting deviations in the system. More 
specifically, a score is calculated using Signal Detection Theory (SDT). The number of 
hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections in each scenario are used to calculate 
sensitivity (A’) and response bias (R:S). Refer to Appendix K for the corresponding 
formulae. Similar to the administration of the self-rated bias questionnaire, a SACRI 
inventory of queries was provided to operators at a random time during the detection 
phase as well as after the mitigation phase for each scenario. The queries are pre-selected 
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for each scenario, but presented in a random order. Operators are asked whether certain 
parameters (e.g. tank level, valve opening, steam pressure) are increasing, decreasing, or 
constant. A complete list of relevant parameters for each scenario is provided in 
Appendix J. 
 
Table 14: SACRI Sensitivity (A’) Summary 
Interface Type Scenario Type Scenario Period  
a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 c1 c2 
Mean 0.5914 0.7246 0.4856 0.6985 0.5025 0.7382 0.4728 
Standard Deviation 0.5268 0.1917 0.5450 0.2257 0.5922 0.2002 0.5897 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Minimum -0.96 0.29 -0.96 0.08 -0.96 0.29 -0.96 
 
Figure 34: Mean SACRI Sensitivity (A’) Scores 
 
 All answers were classified into one of four SDT categories by comparing to the 
actual parameter deviation as recorded by the process expert at the time of the break, i.e. 
not through similar log comparisons. Once the number of hits, misses, false alarms, and 
correct rejections were tallied, sensitivity and response bias were calculated. A summary 
of the scores is provided in Tables 14 and 15. The mean scores are plotted in Figures 34 
and 35. An analysis was carried out to determine the main effects or interactions of 
interface type (A), scenario type (B), and scenario period (C). The results of a 3-way 
repeated measures ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections where appropriate are 
shown in Table 14 for sensitivity and Table 15 for response bias. Residual plots of the 
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data show that the assumptions of constant variance among groups and normality in each 
combination hold. 
Greater accuracy in detecting deviations in the process is indicated by higher A’ 
scores; a score of A’ = 1 is representative of perfect SA, while a score of A’ < 0.5 is 
suggestive of poor SA resulting in decisions made no better than by chance. In applying 
the current SACRI measure, there is a possibility of undefined A’ scores if the number of 
hits or correct rejections is zero. Although Hogg et al. (1995) have stated that undefined 
and negative scores will be limited in practice, no consistent guidelines were provided on 
how such scores are to be dealt with and interpreted. The current experiment produced a 
total of 13 undefined A’ scores out of 72 trials or 816 queries. In a separate analysis 
(Skraaning Jr., 2006), it was determine that the removal of undefined data points could 
not be accommodated due to already limited experimental design. Treating false alarms 
as misses in the undefined conditions exacerbated the number of A’ scores that cannot be 
interpreted. The transformation of accuracy based on number of correct answers to A’ is 
considered to be valid when both are highly correlated (R close to 1), i.e. when all 
answers are classified as correct or incorrect, the resulting score of accuracy should be 
correlated with the transformed score of A’. Substituting the undefined A’ scores with the 
lowest possible score of 0 resulted in a reduced correlation with the proportion correct, R 
= 0.68. Substituting the undefined A’ score with the chance level score of 0.5 resulted in 
a better correlation with the proportion correct, R = 0.82. Accordingly, the latter 
modification was applied to the data. Further discussion on the theoretical shortcomings 
of SACRI is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Table 15: SACRI Response Bias (R:S) Summary 
Interface Type Scenario Type Scenario Period  
a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 c1 c2 
Mean 0.9431 0.9954 0.7740 0.7753 1.0330 0.7741 1.0342 
Standard Deviation 0.8308 0.5294 0.5522 0.3976 0.8150 0.6055 0.6746 
Maximum 4.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 4.00 2.00 4.00 
Minimum 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 35: Mean SACRI Response Bias (R:S) Scores 
 
The mean A’ scores for the Advanced User Centred Design (UCD) and 
Ecological Interface Design (EID) information displays were found to be above 0.5. The 
Traditional Single Sensor-Single Indicator (SS-SI) yielded a mean A’ score of just under 
0.5. However, no main effects or interactions were observed for interface type (A), p > 
0.10 for all conditions. Operator SA is neither improved nor degraded for the Advanced 
UCD and EID information displays in comparison to the Traditional SS-SI information 
displays. There is weak evidence of a difference in A’ scores between anticipated and 
unanticipated scenarios [F(1, 5) = 4.306, p = 0.093]. A higher mean A’ score was 
achieved by operators in the anticipated scenarios. A strong to moderate main effect was 
found for scenario period (C) in which operators achieved significantly higher A’ scores 
during the detection phase vs. the mitigation phase [F(1, 5) = 12.36, p = 0.017]. The 
differences found in the two independent variables cannot, however, be explained 
without factoring in one another. A moderate interaction effect between scenario type (B) 
and scenario period (C) was observed [F(1, 50 = 8.717, p = 0.032] and can be seen in 
Figure 36 as a slope difference between the two lines. A simple effects post-hoc analysis 
on the two independent variables revealed that operators scored significantly lower in 
unanticipated scenarios during the mitigation phases of the scenarios [F(1, 5) = 6.923, p = 
0.046]. Likewise, there is a weak to moderately significant drop in A’ scores for 
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unanticipated scenarios going from the detection phase to the mitigation phase [F(1, 5) = 
5.870, p = 0.060].  
  
Table 16: SACRI Sensitivity (A’) ANOVA 
Effect SS df Mean Square F p 
Interface Type (A) 0.689 1.101 0.626 2.165 0.198 
Scenario Type (B) 0.692 1 0.692 4.306 0.093 
Scenario Period (C) 1.174 1 1.174 12.36 0.017 
AxB 0.792 1.521 0.520 2.559 0.146 
AxC 0.503 1.159 0.434 0.721 0.450 
BxC 0.561 1 0.561 8.717 0.032 




Figure 36: Scenario Type and Scenario Period A’ Interaction Effect 
 
 R:S ratios were examined to provide further insight into the sensitivity results. 
The response bias measure describes the likelihood of an operator to overestimate or 
underestimate the consequences of a particular deviation depending on different factors, 
i.e. independent variables. A R:S ratio of 1.0 indicates no response bias, above 1.0 
indicates overestimation, and below 1.0 indicates underestimation. Figure 35 suggests 
that operators are more likely to overestimate unanticipated events and underestimate 
anticipated events. In spite of this, the results of the ANOVA show no evidence of R:S 
ratio differences for interface type (A) and scenario type (B). There exists, however, a 
moderate interaction between the two variables as shown in Figure 35 [F(1.979, 9.895) = 
4.672, p = 0.038]. A post-hoc simple effects analysis revealed differences in R:S ratios 
 74
between the three interface types in unanticipated scenarios [F(1.927, 9.633) = 4.161, p = 
0.051]. Accordingly, a pair-wise comparison using the least significant difference 
approach was conducted on the R:S estimated marginal means. R:S ratios for both the 
Advanced UCD and EID information displays were found to be significantly different 
from the Traditional SS-SI information displays, p ≤ 0.05. Operators using the Advanced 
UCD and EID information displays were inclined to overestimate deviations compared to 
the Traditional SS-SI information displays from which users underestimated. 
Furthermore, only the Advanced UCD information displays resulted in a difference in 
R:S ratios between anticipated and unanticipated scenarios [F(1, 5) = 16.574, p = 0.01]; 
greater overestimations were observed in unanticipated scenarios.  
 Although no evidence was found to indicate response bias differences for 
interface type (A) and scenario type (B) factors, the results indicate a moderate main 
effect for scenario period (C) [F(1, 5) = 4.672, p = 0.038]. Additionally, a weak 
interaction effect was observed between scenario type (B) and scenario period (C) [F(1, 
5) = 5.031, p = 0.075], see Figure 38. A post-hoc simple effects analysis suggests a 
difference scenario type R:S ratios during the mitigation phase [F(1, 5) = 7.307, p = 
0.043] in which there is a tendency for operators to overestimate in unanticipated 
scenarios and underestimate in anticipated scenarios. Likewise, there is a significant 
increase in the R:S ratio as the scenario proceeds from the detection phase to the 
mitigation phase for unanticipated scenarios [F(1, 5) = 8.043, p = 0.036]. No other 
interaction effects were found in the analysis. A complete discussion and interpretation of 
self-rated bias, HOPE, and SACRI results as they related to the hypotheses can be found 
in the following chapter. 
 
Table 17: SACRI Response Bias (R:S) ANOVA 
Effect SS df Mean Square F p 
Interface Type (A) 0.643 1.696 0.379 1.903 0.208 
Scenario Type (B) 1.196 1 1.196 3.103 0.138 
Scenario Period (C) 1.218 1 1.218 7.892 0.038 
AxB 2.657 1.979 1.342 4.672 0.038 
AxC 0.358 1.482 0.241 0.380 0.637 
BxC 0.907 1 0.907 5.031 0.075 
















This chapter discusses the results of the data analysis presented in Chapter 5, its 
implications, and limitations. The directional and non-direction hypotheses stated in 
Chapter 4 are addressed. Situation awareness (SA) scores were measured using the self-
rating bias, Halden Open Probe Elicitation (HOPE), and Situation Awareness Control 
Room Inventory (SACRI) approaches to provide better insight into actual operator SA. 
The preliminary results suggest that operator SA is not affected by differences in 
interface design alone. Other factors, namely scenario type and period, were found to 
have a greater effect on operator SA. A variety of potentially confounding issues and 
limitations may have contributed to the lack of sizable differences in the scores as 
hypothesized. Limiting factors in the experimental design including participant selection, 
training, and scenario design are examined. Technical complications encountered during 
the experiment are also identified and investigated for possible effects on the results.  
 
6.1 Hypotheses Verification 
 
Both directional and non-directional hypotheses were made for two of the main 
independent variables given evidence from prior research: interface type and scenario 
type. Although no speculations were made for the scenario period independent variable, 
the results will be discussed below. Note that unlike the SAGAT approach to measuring 
SA, the queries generated for the three dependent measures in no way incorporated the 
SA levels defined by Endsley (1995). In essence, the self-rated bias, HOPE, and SACRI 
measures are intended to describe overall SA, which includes all three levels. For 
example, the SACRI sensitivity score generally provides a measure of accuracy on the 
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detection and comprehension of elements in the environment, i.e. Level 1 and 2 SA, 
whereas the SACRI response bias score provides a measure of quality of operator 
projections and strategy selection, i.e. Level 3 SA. Accordingly, the SA scores were not 
parsed or examined by level.  
 
6.1.1 Main Effect: Interface Type 
 
It is hypothesized that a significant difference exists between the mean SA scores (m) of 
the turbine operators for the different interface types. In particular, the mean SA scores 
for the Ecological Interface Design (a1) interface type will be significantly greater than 
the mean SA scores for the Advanced User Centred Design (a2) and Traditional Single 
Sensor-Single Indicator (a3) interface types. 
 
H0: ma1 = ma2 = ma3  
H1: mi ≠ mj for some i and j  (non-directional) 
H1: ma1 > ma2 > ma3 (directional) 
 
The evidence acquired from the experiment and data analysis was not sufficient to reject 
the null hypothesis (H0). The mean SA scores between operators using the Ecological 
Interface Design (EID), Advanced User Centred Design (UCD), and Traditional Single 
Sensor-Single Indicator (SS-SI) information displays did not differ significantly from one 
another. The operators scored similarly on the self-rating bias measure with averages 
indicative of overall moderate SA; mean scores were found to be slightly above 3 on a 
scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is poor SA and 5 is perfect SA. Likewise, the operators scored 
approximately the same on the HOPE Level of Understanding (LoU) measure; however, 
mean scores fell between 1 (some understanding) and 2 (good understanding) on a scale 
of 0 to 3. As such, it can be reasoned that the operators are detecting some/most of the 
process deviations, reaching partly/mostly correct diagnoses, and carrying them out 
partly/mostly correct (see Appendix G). The mean SACRI sensitivity scores of the three 
interface types ranged approximately from 0.49 to 0.72 on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is 
representative of perfect SA; the scores did not differ significantly from one another and 
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suggested moderate to good operator SA. Additionally, the mean SACRI response bias 
scores indicate minor underestimation of deviating processes as the scores for each 
interface type were found to be slightly below 1.  
In conclusion, the EID information displays did not improve or degrade operator 
SA in comparison to the Advanced UCD and Traditional SS-SI information displays in 
all scenario types and periods. The findings suggest that the expected benefits of the EID 
approach can be similarly achieved by the other two design methodologies when factors 
such as anticipated and unanticipated events are not differentiated. However, the effects 
of scenario type and period on operator SA for each interface type may be considerable. 
See Section 6.1.3 for a discussion on the interaction effects. Resource constraints, 
including limited training and lack of participants, may have, however, confounded the 
results. The expected outcome inferred from prior EID and SA research was not obtained. 
See Section 6.3 for details. 
 
6.1.2 Main Effect: Scenario Type 
 
It is hypothesized that a significant difference exists between the mean SA scores (m) of 
the turbine operators for the difference scenario types. In particular, the mean SA scores 
for anticipated scenarios (b1) will be significantly greater than the mean SA scores for 
unanticipated scenarios (b2). 
 
H0: mb1 = mb2  
H1: mb1 ≠ mb2 (non-directional) 
H1: mb1 > mb2 (directional) 
 
The evidence acquired from the experiment and data analysis was not sufficient to reject 
the null hypothesis (H0). The mean SA scores between anticipated and unanticipated 
scenarios did not differ significantly from one another. The mean self-rated bias scores 
were essentially the same for both scenario types; approximately 3.2 on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 is representative of perfect SA. As well, no difference in HOPE LoU scores were 
found; both scenario types yielded scores of approximately 1.3 on a scale of 0 to 3, where 
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3 denotes full understanding of a situation (see Appendix G). While anticipated scenarios 
yielded slightly higher SACRI sensitivity scores, the evidence is weak and inconclusive: 
mean sensitivity scores of 0.70 in anticipated scenarios vs. 0.50 in unanticipated 
scenarios on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is representative of perfect SA. No significant 
differences were found in SACRI response bias scores, which indicates little to no 
underestimation of process deviations in both anticipated and unanticipated scenarios. 
 It can be concluded that operator SA remains relatively constant when 
unanticipated situations arise for all interface types and scenario periods, i.e. no 
improvement or degradation in comparison to anticipated events. Though generally 
thought to decrease the amount of cognitive resources available for achieving higher 
levels of SA, the unanticipated scenarios presented in the experiment did not yield the 
expected results. It is known that interfaces and training programs cannot be designed to 
support specific unanticipated events, i.e. events are not known ahead of time and cannot 
be incorporated into the design. As such, it is expected that the interface types will have 
an effect on operator SA depending on the type of event encountered. See Section 6.1.3 
for a discussion on the interaction effects. Again, resource constraints and limitations 
with scenario design may have contributed to the lack of differences. In particular, it was 
observed that the outcome of several anticipated scenarios would have differed had there 
been a shift supervisor on the crew to coordinate standardized responses to known 
process deviations. See Section 6.3 for more details. 
 
6.1.3 Interaction Effect: Interface Type and Scenario Type 
 
It is hypothesized that a significant difference exists between the mean SA scores (m) of 
the turbine operators for some treatment combination of interface type and scenario type. 
No difference in the mean SA scores is expected between the interfaces for anticipated 
scenarios (b1). Given that each design approach handles unanticipated scenarios (b2) in 
a unique manner, a significant difference in the mean SA scores between the interfaces is 
expected. In particular, the mean SA scores for the EID information displays will be 
greater than or equal to the mean SA scores for the Advanced UCD information displays, 
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while the mean SA scores for the Traditional SS-SI information displays will be 
significantly lower.  
 
H0: mij - mi’j - mij’ - mi’j’ = 0 for all treatment combinations 
H1: mij - mi’j - mij’ - mi’j’ ≠ 0 (non-directional) 
H1: ma1b1 = ma2b1 = ma3b1 > ma1b2 ≥ ma2b2 ≥ ma3b2 (directional) 
 
The evidence acquired from the experiment and data analysis was largely not sufficient to 
reject the null hypothesis (H0), i.e. majority of the dependent measures did not result in 
significance. Under all interface type and scenario type treatment combinations, the 
operators scored similarly on self-rated bias and HOPE LoU; the three information 
displays yielded moderate to good operator SA under both anticipated and unanticipated 
scenarios. Although no interaction effect was found in the SACRI sensitivity scores, the 
SACRI response bias scores show that operators using EID and Advanced UCD 
information displays have a tendency to overestimate unanticipated process deviations in 
comparison to the Traditional SS-SI information displays. The SACRI results suggest 
that operators achieved less than ideal SA during unfamiliar events due to poor projection 
of deviating elements. However, the SACRI response bias differences alone do not 
provide adequate evidence to show that operators achieve better SA using certain 
interfaces under specific scenario types. 
 While the EID and Advanced UCD information displays did not improve overall 
operator SA over Traditional SS-SI information displays in unanticipated scenarios, 
operator ability to achieve ideal SA is affected. When examined alone, the EID and 
Advanced UCD information displays resulted in riskier projections and strategy 
selections, whereas the Traditional SS-SI information display motivated conservative 
decision making. It is possible that visual elements such as emergent features and 
historical trend plots in the non-traditional displays lead to looser projections. However, a 
more likely explanation is that training was limited, particularly in the use of advanced 
graphical features, some of which require more experience than time allowed. For 
example, the individual graphics in the EID information display such as the mass 
balances are intended to support skill-based behaviour including the perception of 
 81
process deviations. The graphics are organized in a manner to support knowledge-based 
behaviour that develops primarily over time through experience. The effect was perhaps 
not seen in the Traditional SS-SI information display due to similarities with the existing 
control room interfaces, which are generally approached in a conservative manner.  
 It was hypothesized that unanticipated events could be supported through the 
visualisation of work environment constraints. Prior research has shown that the detection 
of out-of-bounds conditions, which are not typically apparent in non-EID information 
displays, allows for better diagnosis of new and unfamiliar situations. The self-rated, 
HOPE LoU, and SACRI sensitivity scores acquired from the experiment did not confirm 
the hypothesis. As mentioned previously, the condensed training program is likely to 
have contributed to ineffective use of the advanced graphical features in the interfaces, 
i.e. not used to full potential. See Section 6.3 for more details on the possible limitations 
of the study. However, it can be concluded that operator SA is not degraded through the 
use of EID information displays despite minimal training, i.e. no worse than operator SA 
achieved in Traditional SS-SI information displays.  
 
6.1.4 Main Effect: Scenario Period 
 
For exploratory purposes, the data acquired in the experiment was examined for a main 
effect of scenario period. The data analysis on HOPE LoU and SACRI sensitivity scores 
revealed significant differences in operator SA while progressing from detection to 
mitigation phase in a scenario. No evidence of changes in mean SA scores was found 
from the self-rated bias measure. A quadratic trend was observed over time for the HOPE 
measure where the LoU scores increase going into the mitigation phase and slowly 
decrease towards the end of the scenario. The effect is not unexpected given that an 
operator’s understanding of a situation increases as more information is acquired over 
time. A subsequent drop in HOPE LoU scores was nonetheless encountered during the 
mitigation phase. It is suspected that as the mitigation phase progresses, the operators are 
faced with an increasing number of events and information thus reducing the amount of 
cognitive resources available even further; operators are likely attempting to problem 
solve and detect new deviations at the same time. The effect is more clearly illustrated in 
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the SACRI sensitivity scores where a significant drop occurs in the mitigation phase. 
Operators averaged 0.74 during the detection phase and 0.47 at the end of the mitigation 
phase on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 is representative of perfect SA. As well, operators 
were more likely to underestimate deviations in the detection phase vs. the mitigation 
phase. An overall increase was observed in the HOPE LoU scores despite the quadratic 
trend. The lack of a consistent effect indicates a possible limitation in the experiment and 
measurement. 
 Similar to the hypothesized interaction effects between interface type and scenario 
type, it can be expected that EID information displays improve operator SA in both the 
detection and mitigation phases. Specific visual elements such as blue diamond set points 
in the valve-positioning graphic are intended to provide operators with a skill-based 
mechanism to detect deviations, i.e. changes are readily perceived. The embedded 
abstraction hierarchy of the turbine systems aims to aid operator development of accurate 
mental models for problem solving. The Advanced UCD information displays attempt to 
improve change detection over time primarily through trend graphics, but theoretically 
lack components required to support knowledge-based behaviour. Accordingly, 
differences in operator SA are expected between the three interface types and scenario 
periods. However, contrary to the above assumptions, no evidence was found to indicate 
that such differences existed. Again, it is suspected that the results are constrained by the 
experimental design and measurement approaches, though it is likely that the features in 
the different interfaces affect the detection and mitigation phases equally, i.e. no 
interaction effect. See Section 6.3 for more details. 
 
6.2 Contributions to Ecological Interface Design and Situation 
Awareness 
 
As summarized in Chapter 1, this thesis aims to make several contributions to existing 
EID and SA literature. The development of EID information displays for the turbine 
secondary systems of the Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor power plant is thoroughly 
described in Chapter 3. The design process outlined in Burns and Hajdukiewicz (2004) 
was effectively adapted to the larger-scale system of interest in this study. A modularised 
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approach to the system analysis was made possible by careful division of the subsystems. 
All interactions such as material exchange between the subsystems were noted as such to 
prevent loss of information when the products, i.e. Work Domain Models, of each 
module were merged. The EID framework is shown in this study to be adequately 
flexible for large-scale complex systems consisting of subsystems; analysis and design 
can be carried out separately and in parallel to maximize resources. 
The experimental design and evaluation of EID information displays in a next-
generation simulated control room (HAMMLAB) with trained nuclear power plant 
operating crews is covered in Chapter 4. The experiment was carried out fully and 
successfully aside from some minor technical problems in the simulator. The current EID 
study is among one of the few conducted in a full-scope environment involving licensed 
operators. Given that the benefits of EID have been replicated in small laboratory studies, 
the data collected in this experiment provides results that are of higher ecological validity 
and representative of effects in actual control room environments. Recall that this thesis 
in particular examines the effects of EID on SA and not on performance, which prior 
research has focused on. At the same time, it is possible to confound the results by 
employing operators already familiar with the control condition, in this case the 
Traditional SS-SI information displays. Since the interfaces are currently still under 
evaluation, i.e. not implemented in the live Forsmark 3 control room, it is hoped that any 
past experience with HAMMLAB and the Traditional SS-SI information displays is 
negated through training. A little over half of the operators participated in past 
HAMMLAB studies. 
Although insufficient evidence was found in the data analysis to suggest that the 
EID approach offered superior support for operator SA, the results provide a basis for 
forthcoming studies examining the effects of EID on SA. The EID information displays 
yielded comparable SA scores to the other interface types; in effect, EID support for 
operator SA was determined to be no better or worse than that provided by existing 
traditional control room interfaces. Without taking the limitations of the study into 
account, the findings supply further evidence of the fundamental differences between 
performance and SA. It has been shown in previous research that an increase in operator 
performance does not necessarily result in an increase SA (Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 
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2003). The EID approach is expected to improve operator performance over the other 
existing design approaches as established in prior EID research (Vicente, 1999a). 
Nonetheless, it cannot be concluded that an equivalent increase in SA occurs along with 
an increase in performance. Limitations namely involving training and participant 
sampling appear to be contributing factors to the lack of differences in operator SA. It is 
possible that proper rule-based corrective actions were carried out as a result of 
experience in spite of minimal interface training, which is suspected to have led to non-
ideal SA. Note that performance data collected via the Operator Performance Assessment 
System (OPAS) measure is currently being examined in a separate study. 
 Overall, operators developed moderate to good SA under all interface and 
scenario conditions; mean SA scores fell halfway between the points indicating poor SA 
and perfect SA. The resulting self-rated bias, HOPE LoU, and SACRI scores serve as 
absolute benchmarks for follow-up experiments utilising similar measures. Without an 
analysis to classify SA scores by level, it is not possible to determine precisely at which 
level improvement is needed. Because Level 3 SA is theorized to require Levels 1 and 2 
SA, i.e. an operator cannot form accurate projections without the first two levels, it can 
be inferred that operators in the present study did not successfully achieve Level 3 SA. 
Though the EID information displays were expected to improve Levels 1 and 2 SA, the 
results obtained suggest potential effects from training and experience. Usability data 
collected during the experiment may be used to enhance certain elements in the 
interfaces, but improvements to operator SA appear to require changes beyond the 




A number of limitations related to the experimental design and the technical aspects of 
the simulating environment were identified in the study (no particular order):  
 
- Participant experience: A wide range of experienced control room operators were 
recruited from the Forsmark 3 boiling water reactor nuclear power plant for the 
experiment. The demographic details of the participants are summarized in Table 9. 
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Though unlikely to have significantly influenced the SA results, it should be noted 
that some of the current reactor operators (RO) and shift supervisors (SS), i.e. former 
turbine operators (TO), were asked to perform the tasks of a TO. Because the present 
study focuses on the turbine systems to the plant, a greater number of present TO 
participants would have been preferable. Participation was open to all control room 
operators, no experience restrictions. 
 
- Crew composition: As noted previously, a typical control room crew consists of one 
TO, one RO, and one SS. Due to the limited number of participants, the SS role was 
excluded from the study. Furthermore, the study focuses on the effects of different 
interfaces on TO SA alone as team SA is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it 
was observed that the lack of a SS was detrimental to TO SA on several occasions, in 
which certain cross-system information such as that from the reactor side would have 
been relayed to the TO. The results are representative of SA acquired and developed 
through mainly the turbine side interfaces.  
 
- Training: The lack of significant differences in operator SA between interfaces and 
scenario types is largely attributed to the limitations in training. Prior to the trials, the 
participants were familiarized with the HAMMLAB environment and trained to use 
the various interfaces. In total, the operators were given 7 hours of instruction. 
Although slightly more time was devoted to the EID information displays, it was not 
possible for participants to fully grasp and understand certain graphical elements 
designed for longer term use, e.g. patterns produced by trend graphs, balance 
displays. In addition, participants were provided with reference sheets as memory 
aids because of the overwhelming number of features found in each interface and in 
particular the EID information displays. Many of the visual elements intended to 
improve Levels 2 and 3 SA, e.g. mass balance bar connections to mimic graphics, 
were perhaps used less effectively than anticipated due to limited experience with the 
interface. Given that some of the participants had prior experience with the 
Traditional SS-SI and Advanced UCD information displays, as well as possible 
positive learning transfer from the existing control room interface, novice EID users 
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can be said to develop SA on par with slightly more experienced Traditional SS-SI 
and Advanced UCD users.  
 
- SA measures: To provide a more extensive view of operator SA, three types of SA 
measures with a variety of different advantages and disadvantages were employed in 
the study; self-rated bias (subjective self), HOPE (subjective third-party), and SACRI 
(objective). A few assumptions are required to be made in order for the data collected 
from the above measures to adequately reflect operator SA. It is assumed that all the 
measures are sufficiently sensitive to differences in operator expertise, changes in 
process state, and changes to the interface. However, the self-rated bias and HOPE 
measures have not been previously tested to verify the assumptions. It is possible that 
the measures do not accurately quantify operator SA. Even with verification of the 
aforementioned assumptions, the underlying fundamentals of the SACRI measure 
were brought into question (Skraaning Jr., 2006). Again, an analysis of measurement 
limitations is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the issue should be considered.  
 
- Data analysis and interpretation: Not considered a limitation, but a topic a related to 
the above points on SA measures; varying results were obtained in a separate 
preliminary analysis (Skraaning Jr., Lau, Welch, Nihlwing, Andresen, Brevig, 
Veland, Jamieson, Burns, & Kwok, 2007; Welch, Braseth, Nihlwing, Skraaning Jr., 
Teigen, Veland, Lau, Jamieson, Burns, & Kwok, 2007) as a result of differences in 
the statistical approach and theoretical interpretation. Due to the SACRI measure 
limitations, a simple accuracy score was calculated with the collected query response 
data. A three-way interaction effect was found between the three variables for both 
accuracy and HOPE (scenario understanding) scores through a multivariate approach. 
The present study forgoes the use of a multivariate analysis due to small sample sizes. 
Additionally, the self-rated bias (metacognitive accuracy) scores included all queries, 
i.e. not specifically measuring SA. However, only a main effect of scenario type was 
revealed. The differences in the results provide an indication of how sensitive the data 
collected is due to the limitations explained in this section. While the present study 
does not separate SA by levels as described in Endsley (1995), an attempt was made 
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in the Appendix J analysis by interpreting the levels through the queries themselves 
rather than the related variables or information. In particular, it can be said that global 
variables in SACRI queries require lower level information found in Level 1 SA and 
as such are associated with Level 2 or higher SA. An alternate interpretation as 
assumed in Appendix J is that all queries probe perception, which in effect is Level 1 
SA. An in-depth analysis of SA theory and measurement is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
- Scenario design: The complexity of both the anticipated and unanticipated events is 
likely to have affected some of the scenario type results, performance data more so 
than SA data. Anticipated scenarios were designed to involve situations that are 
intended to be resolved through standard procedures. Unanticipated scenarios 
included a series of events that could not be diagnosed through traditional rule-based 
strategies. It was observed that the sequence of events in both types of scenarios was 
at times rendered more complex than expected due to operator interaction with the 
system. Actions performed by the operators resulted in new events affecting the 
development of the scenario and thus the corrective actions required for a resolution, 
e.g. an anticipated scenario becoming more difficult to handle through standard 
procedures. In general, the SA measurements are made in a manner relative to the 
present situation thus the effects are expected to be minimal.  
 
- Simulator: Certain elements in the EID information displays were re-designed as a 
result of technical limitations in the simulator and interface design platform (Picasso). 
In particular, the polar star graphics representing valve positioning were replaced due 
to implementation difficulties involving the scaling of the graphics. As well, the lack 
of mass sensors in the turbine subsystems required that the values be calculated in the 
simulator, which were not always accurate due to sampling constraints. Some 
variables traditionally not included in control room interfaces were deemed essential 
in EID information displays, but could not be fully implemented. A few unexpected 
technical problems in the simulator were also encountered during the experiment, one 
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of which required a scenario restart. Any learning effects from the incident is not 
expected to have altered the results significantly as only one trial was affected. 
 
The above list of limitations has influenced the data collected in the present study to 
varying degrees and should be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
Additionally, a follow-up study addressing some of the issues may help in confirming or 





Summary and Recommendations 
 
This study demonstrates the effects of Ecological Interface Design (EID) information 
displays on operator situation awareness (SA) relative to existing human-machine 
interfaces (HMI) in control rooms. The preliminary results suggest that operators 
unfamiliar with EID information displays develop and maintain comparable levels of SA 
to operators using traditional forms of single sensor-single indicator (SS-SI) information 
displays. Operator SA remained relatively constant between anticipated and unanticipated 
scenarios, as well as throughout each scenario, from the detection phase to the mitigation 
phase. In all cases, operators achieved moderate to good SA, i.e. approximately halfway 
to perfect SA. With sufficient training and experience, operator SA is expected to benefit 
from the knowledge-based visual elements in the EID information displays. The 
following are recommendations for expanding the present study: 
 
- Obtaining a sufficient number of licensed participants to field a complete control 
room operating crew consisting of one turbine operator (TO), one reactor operator 
(RO), and one shift supervisor (SS). Allows for better ecological validity and the 
option of examining team SA. 
- Extending the training program in length as well as content to include practice 
scenario sessions that cover all visual elements in each interface. In essence, 
implementing a hands-on approach for practice to support the existing instructional 
elements of the training program. 
- Until some of the fundamental issues with the Situation Awareness Control Room 
Inventory (SACRI) measure are resolved, it is advisable that the study utilises a more 
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established measure such as Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
(SAGAT). 
- Confirming that the EID information displays improve operator performance, i.e. 
examining the Operator Performance Assessment System (OPAS). Subsequently, 
investigating whether a correlation exists between operator performance and SA. 
 
Although the results do not illustrate a significant immediate improvement to 
operator SA in the EID framework, the longer-term effects appear to be promising and 
should be explored in a follow-up study. Nonetheless, the overall findings establish the 
viability of the EID approach in large-scale complex process control systems and in next-
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Table 18: System Number Legend 
System Number Description 
211 Reactor Vessel 
311 Steam Valves 
403 Turbines 
405 Generator 
407 Magnetisation and Voltage Regulation System 
412 Lubrication and Jacking Oil System 
416 Seal Oil System 
421 Main Steam System 
422 Steam Reheat System 
423 Steam Extraction System 
424 Seal and Leakage Steam Leakage System 
441 Main Cooling Water System 
445 Generator Cooling System 
452 Governing Oil System 
461 Condenser and Vacuum System 
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Oil Tanks
(TA3, TA 4)N S
Oil Tanks
(TB7, TB 4)N S
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PIA – KA101 (L1)
PI – KA166 – LNS
TI – KA503 – LNS
PI – KA173 – LNS
PI – KA174 – LNS
PdA – KA201 (H1)
PI – KA102 – LNS
PA – KA175 (L1) – NS
PI – KA165 – LNS
PI – KA170 – NS (omitted )
PI – KA171 – NS (omitted )
PA – KA176 (L1) – NS
PdA – KA202 (H1)
PdA – KA203 (H1)
PdA – KB202 (H1)
PdA – KB203 (H1)
Tanks:
P? – KA111 – NS
P? – KA112 – NS
LA – KA405 (H1) – NS
TIA – KA501 (H1)
TI – KA502 – NS
LA – KA401 (L1, L2)
LIA – KB402 (L2)
LA – KD403 (H1, L2)
 
 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Information Analysis Tables 
 
Table 19: Condensed Information Requirements for Turbine 
Secondary Systems at System Level 
 
Variable Units Availability Constraints Relationships
Turbine load % Measured: 531KA077 Normal: 109%
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 140%
Directly related to % open of turbine control / 
throttle valves (T-FP-2-002).
Turbine rotation speed rpm Measured: 452KA812, 452KA813, 452KA814 109% Load: 1,500 rpm
Minimum: 0 rpm
Maximum: 1,875 rpm
L1 (452KA812): 1,490 rpm
Turbine pressures kPa, bar Measured: 421KA101-102, 421KB101-102 (HP)
Measured: 422KA109-111 (LP)
109% Load: 6.7 MPa (HP), 0.77 MPa (LP)
Minimum: 0 MPa (HP)
Maximum: 9 MPa (HP), 1 MPa (LP)
Generator active power (after transformer) MW Measured: 689KA911 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator active power (before transformer) MW Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator reactive power MVAr Measured: 613KA902 109% Load: -
Minimum: -800 MVAr
Maximum: 800 MVAr
Generator temperature °C Measured 405KA590-601




Feedwater temperature °C Measured 462KA506-507, 462KA513-514 109% Load: 215°C
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 100°C, 150°C
Feedwater temperature entering feedheaters 
affects bleed steam flow (T-AF-003).
Feedwater flow rate kg/s Measured: 312KA031 109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Feedwater flow entering feedheaters affects 
bleed steam flow (T-AF-003).






Mass flow rate in from reactor kg/s Not Available
Measured: 312KA031 (Indirectly)
109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Mass flow rate out to condenser sink kg/s Calculated: (T-AF-1-001) - (T-AF-1-003) 109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: -
Maximum: -





Affected by feedwater temperature entering 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?). 
Energy in from reactor kJ/kg Calculated: Saturated steam table lookup with temperature 




Energy converted: thermal-mechanical kJ/kg Calculated: h(inlet) - h(outlet) = hg(T-GF-1-006, T-GF-1-
007) - hf(T-GF-2-?, T-GF-2-?) @ 12% moisture (HP)
Calculated: hf(inlet) - hf(outlet) = hg(T-GF-1-006, T-GF-1-
007) - h(T-GF-1-008, T-GF-1-009) @ 12% moisture (LP)
109% Load: 
Minimum: -
Maximum: 205.83 kJ/kg (HP)
Energy converted: mechanical-electrical kJ/s Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294,000 kJ/s
Minimum: 0 kJ/s
Maximum: 1,442,000 kJ/s
Energy out to condenser sink kJ/kg Calculated: Saturated steam table lookup with temperature 




Energy out to feedwater sink kJ/kg Measured: 423VB1, 423VB2 (HP)
Calculated: Saturated steam table lookup with temperature 
and pressure (T-GF-1-010 and T-GF-1-011)
109% Load: ~2,798.5 kJ/kg, ~2,804.2 kJ/kg (HP)
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: ~2,803.4 kJ/kg
Should be equal to feewater energy leaving 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?).
Energy out to various switchyards kJ/s Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294,000 kJ/s
Minimum: 0 kJ/s
Maximum: 1,442,000 kJ/s













Pressure difference across turbine control / 
throttle valves
kPa, bar Calculated: (T-GF-1-002) - (T-GF-1-007) Normal: Less than 5% of input pressure
Minimum: 0 MPa
Maximum: 9 MPa  
 108
Pressure difference across turbines kPa, bar Calculated: (T-GF-1-006) - (T-GF-2-?) (HP)
Calculated: (T-GF-1-?) - (T-GF-1-009) (LP)
Normal: ~5 MPa (HP), ~1 MPa (LP)
Minimum: 0 MPa
Maximum: 9 MPa
Temperature difference across turbines °C Calculated: (T-GF-1-001) - (T-GF-2-?) (HP)
Calculated: (T-GF-2-?) - (T-GF-008) (LP)
Normal: ~120°C (HP), ~200°C (LP)
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 300°C





Turbine pressures kPa, bar Measured: 421KA101-102, 421KB101-102 (HP)
Measured: 422KA109-111 (LP)
109% Load: 6.7 MPa (HP), 0.77 MPa (LP)
Minimum: 0 MPa (HP)
Maximum: 9 MPa (HP), 1 MPa (LP)
Steam exhaust temperature °C Calculated: Normal: 80°C
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 90°C
Steam exhaust pressure kPa, bar Measured: 461KA103-105 Normal: 0-15 kPa
Minimum: 0 kPa
Maximum: 100 kPa
H6 = 90 kPa
Steam bleed temperature °C Measured: 423KA501-502 (HP)
Measured: 423KA506, 423KA509, 423KA512 (LP)
109% Load: 210°C, 233°C (HP)
109% Load: 80°C, 100°C, 185°C (LP)
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 300°C
Steam bleed pressure kPa, bar Measured: 423KB101-102 (HP)
Not Available (LP)
109% Load: - (HP)
Minimum: 0 MPa
Maximum: 3.5 MPa
Pressure changes in response to temperature 
change in feedheater shell (F-GF-1-?)
Cooling hydrogen temperature °C Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: -°C

















Cooling water flow rate kg/s Measured: 445KC301-303 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 65 kg/s
Lubrication oil flow rate kg/s Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: - kg/s
Generator temperature °C Measured 405KA590-601




Generator output current kA Measured: 613KA801 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 50 kA
Generator output voltage kV Measured: 613KA851 109% Load: 20.5 kV
Minimum: 0 kV
Maximum: 25 kV
Auxiliary input current kA Measured: 641KA841-842 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 25 kA
Auxiliary input voltage kV Measured: 641KA891, 641KA893 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 25 kA, 15 kA
Turbine rotation speed rpm Measured: 452KA812, 452KA813, 452KA814 109% Load: 1,500 rpm
Minimum: 0 rpm
Maximum: 1,875 rpm
L1 (452KA812): 1,490 rpm
Turbine virbration mm/s Measured: 403KA707-710 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 mm/s
Maximum: 13.5 mm/s
H1 = 2 mm/s
H2 = 3 mm/s
Generator vibration mm/s Measured: 405KA702-704 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 mm/s
Maximum: 13.5 mm/s
H1 = 2 mm/s
H2 = 3 mm/s
Generator active power (after transformer) MW Measured: 689KA911 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator active power (before transformer) MW Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator reactive power MVAr Measured: 613KA902 109% Load: -
Minimum: -800 MVAr
Maximum: 800 MVAr





Generator capability MW Calculated: Derived on Generator Capabiility Curve from 
generator manufacturer.
109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW





External grid demand MW Setpoint given by supervisor. Normal: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Cooling hydrogen storage level m Not Available Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m
Maximum: - m
Cooling water storage level m Measured: 445KC401-403 Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m
Maximum: 1.45 m
Lubricating oil storage level m Not Available Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m





Table 20: Condensed Information Requirements for Turbine Secondary Systems at 
Subsystem Level 
 
Variable Units Availability Constraints Relationships
Turbine load % Measured: 531KA077 Normal: 109%
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 140%
Directly related to % open of HP turbine control 
/ throttle valves (T-FP-2-002).
Turbine control / throttle valve opening % Measured: 421VA1M, 421VA2M, 421VB1M, 421VB2M Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 100%
Depends directly on turbine load set point 
assuming governor control (T-FP-2-001). 
Affects steam flow through secondary system (T-
AF-2-?) and reactor pressure.
Turbine bypass valve opening % Measured: 421VB6M Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 100%
Depends on turbine load set point assuming 
governor control (T-FP-2-001). Affects steam 
flow through secondary system (T-AF-2-?) and 
reactor pressure.
Turbine rotation speed rpm Measured: 452KA812, 452KA813, 452KA814 109% Load: 1,500 rpm
Minimum: 0 rpm
Maximum: 1,875 rpm
L1 (452KA812): 1,490 rpm
Affected by % open of HP turbine control / 
throttle valves during ramp up.






Affected by % open of HP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
HP turbine pressure kPa, bar Measured: 421KA101-102, 421KB101-102 (HP) 109% Load: 6.7 MPa (HP)
Minimum: 0 MPa (HP)
Maximum: 9 MPa (HP)
Affected by % open of HP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
LP turbine pressure kPa, bar Measured: 422KA109-111 (LP) 109% Load: 0.77 MPa (LP)
Minimum: 0 MPa (HP)
Maximum: 1 MPa (LP)
Affected by % open of LP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
Mass flow rate through system kg/s Not Available
Measured: 312KA031 (Indirectly)
109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Affected by % open of HP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
Generator active power (after transformer) MW Measured: 689KA911 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator active power (before transformer) MW Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Generator reactive power MVAr Measured: 613KA902 109% Load: -
Minimum: -800 MVAr
Maximum: 800 MVAr
Generator temperature °C Measured 405KA590-601




Shaft bearing temperature °C Measured: 403KA522, 403KA528, 403KA530, 403KA532, 




Feedwater temperature °C Measured 462KA506-507, 462KA513-514 109% Load: 215°C
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 100°C, 150°C
Feedwater temperature entering feedheaters 
affects bleed steam flow (T-AF-003).
Feedwater flow kg/s Measured: 312KA031 109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Feedwater flow entering feedheaters affects 
bleed steam flow (T-AF-003).
Mass flow rate in from reactor kg/s Not Available
Measured: 312KA031 (Indirectly)
109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Affected by % open of HP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
Mass turbine bypass to condenser sink steam 
flow rate
kg/s Not Available 109% Load: - kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: - kg/s
Affected by % open of bypass valves: 421VA3-
4, 421VB3-4.
Mass turbine bypass to feedwater sink steam 
flow rate
kg/s Not Available 109% Load: - kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: - kg/s
Affected by % open of fine turbine control 
(bypass) valve: 421VB6.
Mass reheat steam flow rate. kg/s Not Available 109% Load: - kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: - kg/s
Affected by % open of reheat steam control 
valves: 421VA5, 421VB5.
Mass flow rate in to HP turbine kg/s Calculated: (T-AF-2-001) - (T-AF-2-002) - (T-AF-2-003) - (T-AF-
2-004)
109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 2,000 kg/s
Amount of steam admitted per unit time is 
affected by % open of turbine control / throttle 
valves, turbine bypass valve, and reheat steam 
control valve.
Mass flow rate out of HP turbine to reheaters. kg/s Calculated: (T-AF-2-004) + (T-AF-2-?) 109% Load: -
Minimum: -
Maximum: -
Mass flow rate out of HP turbine to feedwater 
sink.





Affected by feedwater temperature entering 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?). 
Mass flow rate out of HP turbine to seal and 
leakage system.
kg/s Not Available 109% Load: -
Minimum: -
Maximum: -
Mass flow rate out of reheaters to LP 
turbines.





Mass flow rate out of reheaters to drains. kg/s Not Available 109% Load: -
Minimum: -
Maximum: -





Affected by % open of LP turbine control / 
throttle valves: 422VA24, 422VB24.





Affected by % open of LP turbine control / 
throttle valves: 422VA25, 422VB25.





Affected by % open of LP turbine control / 
throttle valves: 422VA26, 422VB26.
Mass flow rate out of LP turbine 1 to 
feedwater sink.





Affected by feedwater temperature entering 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?). 
Mass flow rate out of LP turbine 2 to 
feedwater sink.





Affected by feedwater temperature entering 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?). 
Mass flow rate out of LP turbine 3 to 
feedwater sink.





Affected by feedwater temperature entering 
feedheaters (F-GF-1-?). 
Mass flow rate out of LP turbines to 
condenser sink
kg/s Calculated: (T-AF-1-001) - (T-AF-1-003) 109% Load: 1,750 kg/s
Minimum: -
Maximum: -
Affected by % open of HP/LP turbine control / 
throttle valves.
Mass flow rate out of LP turbines to seal and 
leakage system.
kg/s Not Available 109% Load: -
Minimum: -
Maximum: -
Steam enthalpy in from reactor kJ/kg Calculated: Saturated steam table lookup with temperature and 




Turbine bypass to condensesr sink steam 
enthalpy
kJ/kg Measured: At bypass valves 421VA3-4, 421VB3-4 Normal: ~2,772.1 kJ/kg
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg  
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Turbine bypass to feedwater sink steam 
enthalpy
kJ/kg Measured: At turbine fine control (bypass) valve 421VB6 Normal: ~2,772.1 kJ/kg
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Reheat steam enthalpy kJ/kg Measured: At reheat steam control valves 421VA5, 421VB5 Normal: ~2,772.1 kJ/kg
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy in to HP turbine kJ/kg Measured: At HP control / throttle valves 421VA1-2, 421VB1-2 Normal: ~2,772.1 kJ/kg
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
HP turbine leaving loss kJ/kg Calculated: Normal: - kJ/kg
Minimum: - kJ/kg
Maximum: - kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy out of HP turbine to 
reheaters.
kJ/kg Calculated: Saturated steam table lookup with temperature and 




Steam enthalpy out of HP turbine to 
feedwater sink





Steam enthalpy out of HP turbine to seal and 
leakage system.
kJ/kg Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Steam and water enthalpy out of reheaters to 
drains
kJ/kg Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy out of reheaters to LP 
turbine 1
kJ/kg Measured: At control valve 422VA24, 422VB24 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy out of reheaters to LP 
turbine 2
kJ/kg Measured: At control valve 422VA25, 422VB25 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy out of reheaters to LP 
turbine 3
kJ/kg Measured: At control valve 422VA26, 422VB26 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
LP turbine 1 leaving loss kJ/kg Calculated: Normal: - kJ/kg
Minimum: - kJ/kg
Maximum: - kJ/kg
LP turbine 2 leaving loss kJ/kg Calculated: Normal: - kJ/kg
Minimum: - kJ/kg
Maximum: - kJ/kg
LP turbine 3 leaving loss kJ/kg Calculated: Normal: - kJ/kg
Minimum: - kJ/kg
Maximum: - kJ/kg
Steam enthalpy out of LP turbine 1 to 
feedwater sink





Steam enthalpy out of LP turbine 2 to 
feedwater sink





Steam enthalpy out of LP turbine 3 to 
feedwater sink





Steam enthalpy out of LP turbines to 
condenser sink
kJ/kg Calculated: [(T-AF-2-029 + T-AF-2-030 + T-AF-2-031) / 3] - [(T-
AF-2-032 + T-AF-2-033 + T-AF-2-034) / 3] - [(T-AF-2-035 + T-AF-





Steam enthalpy out of LP turbines to seal 
and leakage system
kJ/kg Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kJ/kg
Maximum: ~2,742.1 kJ/kg
Rate of mechanical energy from HP turbine 
transferred to shaft
kJ/s Calculated: 109% Load: - kJ/s
Minimum: - kJ/s
Maximum: - kJ/s
Rate of mechanical energy from LP turbines 
transferred to shaft
kJ/s Calculated: 109% Load: - kJ/s
Minimum: - kJ/s
Maximum: - kJ/s
Rate of electrical energy generated from 
mechanical energy in shaft
kJ/s Measured: 613KA901
Calculated:
109% Load: 1,294 kJ/s
Minimum: 0 kJ/s
Maximum: 1,442 kJ/s
Mass flow rate of oil to bearings from storage 
tank
kg/s Not Available
Mass flow rate of oil to generator from 
storage tank
kg/s Not Available
Mass flow rate of cooling water to generator 
from storage tank
kg/s Measured: 445KC301-303 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 65 kg/s
Mass flow rate of cooling water to bus bars 
from storage tank
kg/s Calculated:
Mass flow rate from reactor to drains kg/s Calculated:













Bypass to condenser sink steam temperature °C Measured: 421KA505-506, 421KB505-506 109%: - °C
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 300°C
Bypass to condenser sink steam pressure kPa, bar Not Available
Bypass to feedwater sink steam temperature °C Measured:
Bypass to feedwater sink steam pressure kPa, bar Not Available
Reheat steam temperature °C
Reheat steam pressure kPa, bar
Temperature of steam at HP turbine control / 
throttle valves
°C
Pressure of steam at HP turbine control / 
throttle valves
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam in to HP turbine °C
Pressure of steam in to HP turbine kPa, bar
Temperature of bleed steam from HP turbine 
to feedwater sink
°C
Pressure of bleed steam from HP turbine to 
feedwater sink
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam and water from 
reheaters to drains
°C
Pressure of steam and water from reheaters 
to drains
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam from HP turbine in to 
reheaters
°C Measured: 422KA501
Pressure of steam from HP turbine in to 
reheaters
kPa, bar Measured: 422KA103




Pressure of steam from reheaters to LP 
turbine 1
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam from reheaters to LP 
turbine 2
°C
Pressure of steam from reheaters to LP 
turbine 2
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam from reheaters to LP 
turbine 3
°C
Pressure of steam from reheaters to LP 
turbine 3
kPa, bar
Temperature of bleed steam from LP turbine 
1 to feedwater sink
°C
Pressure of bleed steam from LP turbine 1 to 
feedwater sink
kPa, bar
Temperature of bleed steam from LP turbine 
2 to feedwater sink
°C
Pressure of bleed steam from LP turbine 2 to 
feedwater sink
kPa, bar
Temperature of bleed steam from LP turbine 
3 to feedwater sink
°C
Pressure of bleed steam from LP turbine 3 to 
feedwater sink
kPa, bar
Temperature of steam from LP turbines to 
condenser sink
°C Calculated: Normal: 80°C
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: 90°C
There is no measuring points directly on LP outlets.
Pressure of steam from LP turbines to 
condenser sink
kPa, bar Measured: 461KA103-105 Normal: 0-15 kPa
Minimum: 0 kPa
Maximum: 100 kPa
H6 = 90 kPa
Measuring point is absolute pressure, i.e. value = atmospheric pressure 
- vacuum pressure. There is no measuring points directly on LP outlets.
Steam moisture in HP turbine % Not Available Normal: - %
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 13-14%
Excessive moisture degrades efficiency and lifespan of turbines, as 
well as reduces efficiency. Needs moisture separator and reheating to 
lower moisture from 10% to 1%.
Steam moisture in LP turbine 1 % Not Available Normal: 1% (LP)
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 13-14%
Excessive moisture degrades efficiency and lifespan of turbines, as 
well as reduces efficiency. Needs moisture separator and reheating to 
lower moisture from 10% to 1%.
Steam moisture in LP turbine 2 % Not Available Normal: 1% (LP)
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 13-14%
Excessive moisture degrades efficiency and lifespan of turbines, as 
well as reduces efficiency. Needs moisture separator and reheating to 
lower moisture from 10% to 1%.
Steam moisture in LP turbine 3 % Not Available Normal: 1% (LP)
Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 13-14%
Excessive moisture degrades efficiency and lifespan of turbines, as 
well as reduces efficiency. Needs moisture separator and reheating to 
lower moisture from 10% to 1%.
Cooling hydrogen temperature °C Not Available Normal: -
Minimum: 0°C
Maximum: -°C












Note: This measures temperature of water before generator / stator. 
Temperature of water flowing out of the generator / stator is measured 
by 445KC502-504.





Note: This measures pressure in water tank before being pumped into 
generator / stator.
Cooling water flow rate kg/s Measured: 445KC301-303 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kg/s
Maximum: 65 kg/s
Generator temperature °C Measured 405KA590-601




Heat removed from generator by the water in generator cooling system 
can indirectly measure temperature.
Generator output current kA Measured: 613KA801 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 50 kA
Generator output voltage kV Measured: 613KA851 109% Load: 20.5 kV
Minimum: 0 kV
Maximum: 25 kV
Auxiliary input current kA Measured: 641KA841-842 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 25 kA
Auxiliary input voltage kV Measured: 641KA891, 641KA893 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 kA
Maximum: 25 kA, 15 kA
Turbine control / throttle valve opening % Measured: 421VA1M, 421VA2M, 421VB1M, 421VB2M Minimum: 0%
Maximum: 100%
Depends directly on turbine load set point 
assuming governor control (T-FP-2-001). 
Affects steam flow through secondary system (T-
AF-2-?) and reactor pressure.
Turbine rotation speed rpm Measured: 452KA812, 452KA813, 452KA814 109% Load: 1,500 rpm
Minimum: 0 rpm
Maximum: 1,875 rpm
L1 (452KA812): 1,490 rpm
Turbine virbration mm/s Measured: 403KA707-710 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 mm/s
Maximum: 13.5 mm/s
H1 = 2 mm/s
H2 = 3 mm/s
Excessive vibration may cause damage to the turbines, indicative of 
friction. Frequency data not simulated.
Generator vibration mm/s Measured: 405KA702-704 Normal: -
Minimum: 0 mm/s
Maximum: 13.5 mm/s
H1 = 2 mm/s
H2 = 3 mm/s
Excessive vibration may cause damage to the generator, indicative of 
friction.Frequency data not simulated.
Generator active power (after transformer) MW Measured: 689KA911 109% Load: -
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Power measured after/on main transformer.
Generator active power (before transformer) MW Measured: 613KA901 109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Primary variable used to monitor power generated vs. setpoint for a 
specific load. Power in bus bars after generator to transformers.
Generator reactive power MVAr Measured: 613KA902 109% Load: -
Minimum: -800 MVAr
Maximum: 800 MVAr
Power in bus bars after generator to transformers. Not simulated 
exactly in HAMBO.





Must take internal power consumption into consideration when looking 
at overall efficiency of plant.
Generator capability MW Calculated: Derived on Generator Capabiility Curve from 
generator manufacturer.
109% Load: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW





External grid demand MW Setpoint given by supervisor. Normal: 1,294 MW
Minimum: 0 MW
Maximum: 1,442 MW
Cooling hydrogen storage level m Not Available Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m
Maximum: - m
Cooling water storage level m Measured: 445KC401-403 Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m
Maximum: 1.45 m
Lubricating oil storage level m Not Available Normal: - m
Minimum: 0 m































































































































































HOPE: Level of Understanding (LoU) Scale 
 
The following description of the LoU scale is reproduced from Skraaning Jr., Nihlwing, 
Welch, and Veland (2005b) for accessibility. The process expert scores the operator 
understanding of the process situation for each probe on a simple LoU scale: 
 
3 Full understanding 
2 Good understanding 
1 Some understanding 
0 Poor understanding 
 
This scoring is done immediately when the operator has responded to the probe, and the 
simulator is running again after the mini-freeze. The scale should be interpreted in the 
following way:  
 
Full understanding: Full understanding means that the operator has, (a) detected all 
process deviations that occurred before an alarm annunciation, (b) has reached a fully 
correct diagnosis, and/or (c) has a fully correct understanding behind the problem solving 
or execution of tasks. 
 
Good understanding: Good understanding means that the operator has, (a) detected all 
process deviations that occurred, (b) has reached a mostly correct diagnosis, and/or (c) 
has a mostly correct understanding behind the problem solving or execution of tasks. 
 
Some understanding: Some understanding means that the operator has, (a) detected some 
process deviations that occurred, (b) has reached a partly correct diagnosis, and/or (c) has 
a partly correct understanding behind the problem solving or execution of tasks. 
 
Poor understanding:  Poor understanding means that the operator has, (a) not detected the 
process deviations that occurred, or falsely detected process deviations that did not occur, 
(b) has not reached a diagnosis, or reached a wrong diagnosis, and/or (c) has no 
understanding, or an incorrect understanding behind the problem solving or execution of 
tasks. Thus, both ignorance and misunderstanding indicate poor LoU.  
 
Note: It is virtually impossible to differentiate between ignorance and misunderstanding: 
Misunderstanding may sometimes lead to full understanding later in the scenario, i.e. 
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through learning by trail and error within the limits of the system’s error tolerance. 
Ignorance, or lack of understanding, indicates a passive approach that may correctly leave 
everything to automation and emergency systems in certain situations. On the other hand, 
ignorance or misunderstanding can lead to severe economical/safety consequences at 
other times. It will therefore vary whether ignorance or misunderstanding indicates the 
poorest LoU, and the exact range order can typically not be revealed by short scenarios. 
Additionally, the semantic difference between ignorance and misunderstanding is not 








The following screen layout was proposed in Skraaning Jr., Welch, and Veland (2005) 
and implemented in the experiment: 
 








































Turbine Operator Side (Right)
 
 
Figure 55: Experiment Screen Layouts 
 
 
In the Traditional Single Sensor-Single Indicator condition, the EID displays (highlighted 
in blue) are replaced with the equivalent HAMBO Traditional displays. Likewise, in the 
Advanced User Centered Design condition, the HAMBO Traditional and EID displays 





Figure 56: Screen Positioning in Control Room (Skraaning Jr., 2005) 
 
 
Between the reactor operator and turbine operator sets of screens is a large-screen display 
of the overall plant processes. Note that a HAMBO version of the large-screen display 
was used for the EID condition. As well, the front-most row of screen is intended for a 
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B. SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RESEARCH 
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a. Briefly describe the purpose (objectives) and rationale of the proposed project and include 
any hypothesis(es)/research questions to be investigated.  Where available, include a copy of 
the research proposal. 
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Purpose: The Halden Reactor Project seeks to investigate the effects of human-machine 
interface (HMI) designs on nuclear power plant operator behaviour in relation to 
performance. Human performance has been cited as one of the foremost critical 
factors in nuclear power plant safety; thus, it is important to evaluate novel and 
innovative HMI design approaches for possible effects on performance. The main 
objective of the proposed study is to compare the effectiveness of two HMI design 
approaches (Ecological Interface Design vs. User-Centered Design) for two 
different types of events (anticipated vs. unanticipated). 
 
Hypotheses: An interaction is expected between the two HMI design approaches and the two 
types of events in relation to the effectiveness of operator behaviours, i.e. 
performance. During anticipated events, no differences are expected in operator 
performance between the two HMI designs. During unanticipated events, 
degradation in operator performance is expected, but will be more pronounced in 
the User-Centered Design HMI than in the Ecological Interface Design HMI. 
 
 
b. In LAY LANGUAGE, provide a one paragraph (approximately 100 words) summary of the 
project including purpose, the anticipated potential benefits, and basic procedures used. 
 
Nuclear power plants are monitored and controlled by operators in control rooms via 
human-machine interfaces (HMI). Nuclear power plant safety is affected operator 
performance, which is in turn enhanced or restricted by the design of the HMI. The 
proposed study is an international intends to evaluate a relatively new design 
methodology known as Ecological Interface Design (EID) in comparison to a more 
traditional User-Centered Design approach. It is one of many studies under the Halden 
Reactor Project, an international research program for the advancement of nuclear 
power technology. The results of the study will provide both HMI designers and users 
with valuable feedback on the two design approaches, in particular whether the EID 
methodology can be applied to improve operator performance. Participants will first be 
trained to use the HMIs on a plant simulator and will then operate through several 
scenarios containing anticipated and unanticipated events from which non-invasive 





a. Which of the following procedures will be used?  Provide a copy of all materials to be 
used in this study.  
*Note: For studies that only use tissue/body fluid specimens from other sources, use ORE 
Form 101T 
 
[    ]  Survey(s) or questionnaire(s) (mail-back)  Are they standardized?  All [    ]  Some [    ]  
None [    ] 
[ X ]  Survey(s) or questionnaire(s) (in person)  Are they standardized?  All [ X ]  Some [    ]  
None [    ] 
[ X ]  Computer-administered task(s) or survey(s) Are they standardized?  All [ X ]  Some [    ]  
None [    ] 
[ X ]  Interview(s) (in person)  
[    ]  Interview(s) (by telephone) 
[    ]  Focus group(s)  
[ X ]  Audiotaping  
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[ X ]  Videotaping 
[    ]  Invasive physiological measurement  
[    ]  Venipuncture 
[    ]  Catheter insertions 
[    ]  Muscle biopsies 
[    ]  Other tissue samples   Specify                                                                   
[    ]  Other  Specify                                                                                            
[    ]  Non-invasive physiological measurement  
[    ]  Exercise 
[    ]  Muscle stimulation 
[    ]  Electromyography 
[    ]  Heart rate 
[    ]  Blood pressure 
[    ]  Other (specify)                                                                                            
[    ]  Analysis of secondary data set (no involvement with human participants) 
[ X ]  Unobtrusive observations  
Other (specify)                                                                                                            
 
b. Provide a brief, sequential description of the procedures to be used in this study.  For 
studies involving multiple procedures or sessions, use of a flow chart is 
recommended. 
 
The study will be carried out on a plant simulator with which the participants have prior 
experience. During training sessions, participants are put into teams of four (4). During 
scenario trial sessions, participants are put into teams of two (2). Scenario teams will be 
participating either in the morning (08:00-14:00) or in the evening (15:00-21:00). During 
each scenario trial, participants will be asked a variety of questions to assess their 
knowledge of the situation as well as their performance. Following each scenario trial, a 
Task Complexity Questionnaire concerning mental workload will be administered 
(Appendix I.C). At the end of all scenario trials, the participants will be debriefed. The 




1. Introduction (0.5 hours): Informed consent (Appendix I.A), demographic 
questionnaire (Appendix I.B), and opportunity for participant questions. 
2. Training (3.0 hours): Participants will be trained in the operation of the HMI. 
3. Lunch break (1.0 hours). 




1. Training (1.0 hours): Participants (morning) will be trained in the operation of the 
HMI. 
2. Break (0.15 hours). 
3. Scenario 1 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the first 
scenario. 
4. Break (0.15 hours). 
5. Scenario 2 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the second 
scenario. 
6. Lunch break (1.00 hours). 
7. Scenario 3 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the third 
scenario. 
8. Break (1.00 hours). 
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9. Training (1.0 hours): Participants (evening) will be trained in the operation of the 
HMI. 
10. Break (0.15 hours). 
11. Scenario 1 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (evening) will complete the first 
scenario. 
12. Dinner (1.00 hours). 
13. Scenario 2 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (evening) will complete the second 
scenario. 
14. Break (0.15 hours). 





1. Scenario 4 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the fourth 
scenario. 
2. Break (0.15 hours). 
3. Scenario 5 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the fifth 
scenario. 
4. Break (0.15 hours). 
5. Scenario 6 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (morning) will complete the sixth 
scenario. 
6. Lunch break (1.00 hours). 
7. Post-test questionnaire and interview (2.00 hours). The participants (morning) will 
respond to questionnaires and participate in an interview 
8. Debriefing for morning (0.50 hours). 
9. Scenario 4 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (evening) will complete the fourth 
scenario. 
10. Break (0.15 hours). 
11. Scenario 5 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (evening) will complete the fifth 
scenario. 
12. Break (0.15 hours). 
13. Scenario 6 Trial (1.0 hours): The participants (evening) will complete the sixth 
scenario. 
14. Post-test questionnaire and interview (2.00 hours). The participants (evening) 
will respond to questionnaires and participate in an interview 
15. Debriefing for evening (0.50 hours). 
 
c. Will this study involve the administration of any drugs?  Yes [     ]     No [  X  ] 
If Yes, specify drugs, dose and administration route. 
 
3. Participants Involved in the Study 
 
a. Indicate who will be recruited as potential participants in this study. 
 
UW Participants:  [    ]   Undergraduate students   
[    ]   Graduate students   
[    ]   Faculty and/or staff  
Non-UW Participants: [     ]  Children  
 [     ]   Adolescents  
 [     ]   Adults  
 [     ]   Seniors  




Other (specify): Potential participants will be recruited from Swedish nuclear power plant           
licensees.                                                                                                           
 
b. Describe the potential participants in this study including group affiliation, gender, age 
range and any other special characteristics. If only one gender is to be recruited, 
provide a justification for this. 
 
For the purpose of this project, participants will be professional, licensed, plant operators 
who are qualified to operate the control system being simulated in the study. Participants 
are employees of a Swedish power plant licensee who is a member of the Halden 
Reactor Project. The licensee and employees are well aware of the activities and 
research conducted by the Halden Reactor Project. Qualified operators are familiar with 
the operation of the simulator to be used in the study. No member of the target 
population will be excluded from the study by investigators.  
 
c. How many participants are expected to be involved in this study?  12   
 
4. Recruitment Process and Study Location 
 
a. From what source(s) will the potential participants be recruited?  
 
[     ]   UW undergraduate and/or graduate classes   
[     ]   UW Psychology Research Experiences Group   
[     ]   Other UW sources (specify):                                                                                        
[     ]   Local School Boards (ORE Form 102 must be completed) 
[     ]   Kitchener-Waterloo Community  
[     ]   Agencies   
[     ]   Businesses, Industries, Professions 
[     ]   Health care settings, nursing homes, correctional facilities, etc.  
 
[  X ] Other, specify (e.g. mailing lists):  Swedish nuclear power plant licensee                       
 
b. Identify who will recruit potential participants and describe the recruitment process.  
Provide a copy of any materials to be used for recruitment (e.g. posters(s), flyers, 
advertisement(s), letter(s), telephone and other verbal scripts). 
 
Potential participants will be recruited on a voluntary basis by the Norwegian Institute for 
Energy Technology (IFE) and the licensee of Swedish nuclear power plants. The 
Division Head of Operation Centre at the IFE will send out a request for participants to a 
management representative responsible for production (contact personnel). The contact 
personnel will then forward the request verbally to the qualified plant operators who may 
in turn respond to participate in the study. The contact personnel is instructed to inform 
potential participants that participation is completely voluntary and their decision will not 
affect their job status or relationship with the nuclear power plant licensee. All 
participants will then be informed and eligible to participate. Please note that the 
recruitment materials are not available in English. 
 
c. Where will the study take place?  If procedures involve direct contact with participants 
or occur in an off-campus setting, please ensure question D2 is completed. 
[    ]  On campus  Location                                                                                       
[ X ]  Off campus  Location  Institute for Energy Technology in Halden, Norway      
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5. Compensation of Participants 
 
Will participants receive compensation (financial or otherwise) for participation? 
Yes [  X  ]   No [     ]       If Yes, provide details: 
 
Participants will be compensated in accordance with their employment contracts 
(through salary) with the licensee of the plants. All travel expenses associated with the 
study will be covered through the Halden Reactor Project. Individuals who elect not to 
participate will not be penalised in any way. 
 
6. Feedback to Participants 
 
Briefly describe the plans for provision of feedback and attach a copy of the feedback 
letter to be used. Wherever possible, written feedback should be provided to study 
participants including a statement of appreciation, details about the purpose and predictions 
of the study, contact information for the researchers, and the ethics review and clearance 
statement.  Refer to the Checklist for Feedback Sheets on ORE web site: 
http://www.research.uwaterloo.ca/ethics/human/samples/checklistfeedback.htm   
 
Note:  When available, a copy of an executive summary of the study outcomes also should 
be provided to participants.  
 
Participants will be debriefed and given feedback upon completing the experiment. 
Please note that the feedback materials are not available in English. 
 
C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THE STUDY 
 
1. Identify and describe any known or anticipated direct benefits to the participants from 
their involvement in the project.  
 
Participants will gain experience operating state-of-the-art Human-Machine Interfaces 
with meaningful event scenarios. Operating tasks in the study are very similar to normal 
training activities (i.e. additional training), which may lead to better understanding of the 
target system. 
 
2.  Identify and describe any known or anticipated benefits to the scientific 
community/society from this study. 
 
Results from the project will allow for improvements to be made in the design of Human-
Machine Interfaces (HMI) in nuclear power plants, which can lead to better safety and 
efficiency. It may also be possible to generalise the results for other control process 
industries such as petrochemical plants, refineries, and chemical manufacturers. 
 
D. POTENTIAL RISKS TO PARTICIPANTS FROM THE STUDY 
 
1. For each procedure used in this study, provide a description of any known or 
anticipated risks/stressors to the participants.  Consider physiological, psychological, 
emotional, social, economic, etc. risks/stressors.  A study-specific medical screening 
form must be included when physiological assessments are used and the associated 
risk(s) to participants is minimal or greater. 
 
[     ]  No known or anticipated risks  
Explain why no risks are anticipated: 
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[  X  ]  Minimal risk  
Description of risks: 
 
Participants will be asked to perform monitoring and control tasks on a nuclear power 
plant simulator that is intended to replicate the operators’ usual work environment. There 
is one anticipated risk: participants may become frustrated while performing some of the 
tasks. The frustration that may be experienced by the participants will be at the same 
level as that found in routine training exercises. That is, the scenarios performed in the 
experiment are similar to the scenarios found in the training exercises. This type of 
training is provided as a normal part of their job, which includes the handling of stressful 
situations. The risk is expected and should not be undue. 
 
[      ]  Greater than minimal risk  
Description of risks: 
 
2. Describe the procedures or safeguards in place to protect the physical and 
psychological health of the participants in light of the risks/stresses identified in D1. 
 
Each trial is to last no more than one (1) hour and each training session is to last no 
more than three (3) hours. Participants will be given breaks in between each trial or 
training session (see B2) and are free to end the study at any point. Investigators will 
emphasise that the purpose of the study is to assess the design of the Human-Machine 
Interfaces (HMI) and not the expertise of the operators in order to minimize the risk 
described in D1. 
 
E. INFORMED CONSENT PROCESS 
Refer to requirements for content under Elements for Information Letters and Consent 




1. What process will be used to inform the potential participants about the study details 
and to obtain their consent for participation? 
 
[  X ]   Information letter with written consent form; provide a copy   
[     ]   Information letter with verbal consent; provide a copy   
[     ]   Information/cover letter; provide a copy   
Other (specify):                                                                                                    
 
Please see Appendix I.G. 
 





3. Does this study involve persons who cannot give their own consent (e.g. minors)? 
Yes[    ]    No [ X ] 
 
If Yes, provide a copy of the Information Letter and Permission Form to be used to obtain 




F. ANONYMITY OF PARTICIPANTS AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA 
 
1. Explain the procedures to be used to ensure anonymity of participants and 
confidentiality of data both during the research and in the release of the findings.  
 
All participants will be assigned a non-descriptive alias, which will be used on personal 
information, performance data, and interview documents. Aliases will not be made 
available to other participants or to the participants’ employers. Data will be combined 
and analysed in such a way that participants are not identified in the results.  
 
For audio and video recordings, a stationary camera will be placed behind each 
participant such that the participant’s face will be shielded. Head mounted cameras will 
also be used, which make it possible for other participants to be recorded. However, the 
intention of the audio and video recordings is to capture the participant’s interaction with 
the Human-Machine Interface (HMI). All participants will be identified only by their alias 
in the recordings.  
 
It should be noted that the audio and video recordings will be used in conjunction with 
other data collected throughout the experiment at the HRP and participating institutions. 
All participants will have the right to view their own data. All information provided by the 
participants will be considered confidential. Data will only be used for the purpose of the 
experiment described above and for no other purposes. Results of the study will be 
presented in internal HRP publications and international scientific journals such that 
participants cannot be identified in any way. 
 
2. Describe the procedures for securing written records, questionnaires, video/audio 
tapes and electronic data, etc. 
 
See Appendix I.D. 
 
3. Indicate how long the data will be securely stored, the storage location, and the 
method to be used for final disposition of the data. 
 
[  X ]  Paper Records 
[      ] Confidential shredding after ______ years 
[  X  ] Data will be retained indefinitely in a secure location 
[  X  ]  Audio/Video Recordings   
[      ]   Erasing of audio/video tapes after ______ years  
[  X  ]   Data will be retained indefinitely in a secure location 
[  X  ]  Electronic Data   
[      ]   Erasing of electronic data after ______ years   
[  X  ]   Data will be retained indefinitely in a secure location 
[     ]  Other (provide details on type, retention period and final disposition, if applicable): 
                                                                                                                                 
 
Specify storage location:  See Appendix I.D.                                                                        
 
4. Are there conditions under which anonymity of participants or confidentiality of data 
cannot be guaranteed?   Yes [     ]  No  [  X ] 





Will this study involve the use of deception?  Yes [    ]   No [  X ] 
If Yes, describe the deception(s) to be used in this study AND provide a justification for its 
use. 
 
If Yes, outline the process to be used to debrief participants.  Attach a copy of the written 
debriefing sheet and the materials used to obtain consent following debriefing. 
 
 
Researchers must ensure that all supporting materials/documentation for their applications 
are submitted with the signed, hard copies of the ORE form 101/101A.  Note that materials 
shown below in bold are normally required as part of the ORE application package. The 
inclusion of other materials depends on the specific type of projects.   
 
* Researchers are advised to review the Sample Materials section of the ORE web site:  
http://www.research.uwaterloo.ca/ethics/human/informed_consent.asp  
 
Please check below all appendices that are attached as part of your application package: 
 
[     ]  Recruitment Materials: A copy of any poster(s), flyer(s), advertisement(s), letter(s), 
telephone or other verbal script(s) used to recruit/gain access to participants. 
[  X ]  Information Letter and Consent Form(s)*.  Used in studies involving interaction 
with participants (e.g. interviews, testing, etc.)   
[     ]  Information/Cover Letter(s)*.  Used in studies involving surveys or questionnaires.    
[     ]  Parent Information Letter and Permission Form*.  For studies involving minors.   
[     ]  Medical Screening Form: Must be included for all physiological measurements 
involving greater than minimal risk and tailored for each study.   
[  X ]  Materials: A copy of all survey(s), questionnaire(s), interview questions, interview 
themes/sample questions for open-ended interviews, focus group questions, or any 
standardized tests used to collect data. 
[     ]  Feedback letter * 
[     ]  Debriefing Letter: Required for all studies involving deception. 
[     ]  Post-Debriefing Consent Form.  Required for all studies involving deception. 
[  X ]  Ethics Approval Certificate from other institution’s  Research Ethics Board.  A copy is 
required for multi-centred research.  
[     ]  ORE Form 102: To be submitted by applicants who wish access to students and/or 
teachers from the local school boards. 
[     ]  Research Proposal: A copy should be appended for faculty, undergraduate or 
graduate research if available. 
[     ]  Other:                                                                                                                         
 
NOTE: The submission of incomplete application packages will increase the duration of the 
ethics review process. 
To avoid common errors/omissions, and to minimize the potential for required revisions, 
applicants should ensure that their application and attachments are consistent with the 
Checklist For Ethics Review of Human Research Application  
http://www.research.uwaterloo.ca/ethics/form101/checklist.asp 
 
Remember to print and sign the application and forward TWO copies of the application with all 
supporting materials to the Office of Research Ethics, NH 1024.    
 
NOTE: The study may not begin until written notice of full ethics clearance has been received 






I have read the Office of Research Ethics Guidelines for Research with Human Participants 
and agree to comply with the conditions outlined in the Guidelines.  In the case of student 
research, as Faculty Supervisor, my signature indicates that I have read and approved the 
application and proposal, deem the project to be valid and worthwhile, and agree to provide the 
necessary supervision of the student. 
 
                                                                                                                        
Signature of Faculty Investigator  Date 
 
                                                                                                                        
Signature of Faculty Investigator/Supervisor  Date 
 
                                                                                                                        
Signature of Student Investigator  Date 
 
                                                                                                                        











                                                                                                                             
Susan E. Sykes, Ph.D., C. Psych. Date 
Director, Office of Research Ethics 
Or 
Susanne Santi, M.Math. 








Appendix I.A: Informed Consent/QA-F-202: Consent for participation in study of 

















Appendix I.C: Task Complexity Questionnaire 
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Appendix I.F: University of Toronto Ethics Approval Certificate 
 157
Full Ethics Clearance after provisional, no comments (ORE # 12691) 
Tue, Dec 13, 2005 at 4:09 PM 
 
ORE Ethics Application System <OHRAC@uwaterloo.ca>  





The recommended revisions/additional information requested in the initial ethics review of your ORE 
application: 
 
Title: Halden Reactor Project 
ORE #: 12691 
Collaborator: Greg Jamieson (jamieson@mie.utoronto.ca) 
Faculty Supervisor: Catherine M. Burns (c4burns@engmail.uwaterloo.ca) 
Student Investigator: Jordanna Kwok (j2kwok@engmail.uwaterloo.ca) 
 
have been reviewed and are considered acceptable. As a result, your application now has received full 
ethics clearance. 
 
A signed copy of the Notification of Full Ethics Clearance will be sent to the Principal Investigator or 
Faculty Supervisor in the case of student research. 
 
ADDITIONAL REVISIONS OR RESPONSES TO COMMENTS: N/A 
 
********************************************* 
Note 1: This clearance is valid for four years from the date shown on the certificate and a new application 
must be submitted for on-going projects continuing beyond four years. 
 
Note 2: This project must be conducted according to the application description and revised materials for 
which ethics clearance have been granted. All subsequent modifications to the protocol must receive prior 
ethics clearance through our office and must not begin until notification has been received. 
 
Note 3: Researchers must submit a Progress Report on Continuing Human Research Projects (ORE Form 
105) annually for all ongoing research projects. In addition, researchers must submit a Form 105 at the 
conclusion of the project if it continues for less than a year. 
 
Note 4: Any events related to the procedures used that adversely affect participants must be reported 
immediately to the ORE using ORE Form 106. 
 
Best wishes for success with this study. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Susanne Santi, M. Math., 
Manager, Research Ethics 











Abbreviated versions of the: (1) Self-Rated Bias Questionnaire, (2) HOPE Query 
Timelines and Probes, and (3) SACRI parameters, found in Skraaning , Nihlwing, Welch, 
& Veland (2005a) are included below for reference. 
 
Self-Rated Bias Questionnaire 
 
Part 1 - In this scenario period: 
 
1. I had a good a overview of the process, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
2. I made correct diagnoses, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
3. I utilized the displays well, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
4. I became aware of process deviations at an early stage, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
 
Part 2 - In this scenario period: 
 
1. I had a good a overview of the process, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
2. I used my time efficiently, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
3. I cooperated well with the rest of the shift team, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
4. I made correct diagnoses, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
5. My actions steered the process in the correct direction, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
6. I utilized the displays well, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
7. I became aware of process deviations at an early stage, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
8. I performed the correct responses, 1 (Disagree) – 5 (Agree) 
 
 
HOPE Query Timelines and Probes 
 
Anticipated Scenario 1 
 
No Est. Time Condition Probes 
1 ~ 8 min 5 min after 
leakage initiated 
• Leakage from tube to shell in intermediate superheater, 422EA1 
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2 ~ 10 min Break 
Just before 313 
PB2 pump stop 
• Reduced temp on steam: temp diff 422KA504 and KB504 
• Reduced drainage from, superheater: diff  422VA6 and VB6 
• Increased drainage from LPH: Position of drainage valve 
462VB29 increases  
• Increasing condensate flow to fw tank and increasing 462VA5 
position 
3 ~ 18 min 1.30 min after 
alarm on diff 
• Trip on one circulation pump 
• Send out FO 
• Reduce power to 90%, to restart pump  
• Handle leakage: decrease position of 421VA/B5 until temp diff 
10 degrees 
4 ~ 40 min End 
7 min after 421 
stuck 
• Stuck steam valve to HP turbine 
• Halt power increase 
 
Anticipated Scenario 2 
 
No Est. Time Condition Probes 
1 ~ 8 min 1.38 m 
Mf take effect at 
220MW 
2 ~ 10 min Break 
Just before 1.72 
m 
• 463VA20, emergency drain valve  does not open in HPH  
• Emergency drain valve 463VB19 does not open because of low 
power (<220 MW) 
• 423VB7 bleed valve cannot be closed because of mf; thus, level 
will increase and bypass cannot be prevented. 
• High level in HPH, 463K402 and auto bypass 
3 ~ 16 min After VA5 closes • Reset bypass when HPH level ok: VB7 does not open 
• Increase power and open 463VA20 
• Increasing sea temp to pressure increasing in condenser 
• 462VA5 is closing and VB5 does not open; no flow to 
feedwater tank 
• TO has to regulate water level manually by controlling VB5 
• Plant will trip because of low level in FW tank, if the operator 
does not succeed 
• RO: 314VB4 relief valve does not open and 314VA17 closed 
• RO: cooling water pump 713 PC1 trip 
4 ~ 24 min End 
After VA4 
• Min flow valve 463VA4 opens (FW pump PA1) 
• Reduced flow and decreasing reactor tank level 
 
Anticipated Scenario 3 
 
No Est.Time Condition Probes 
1 ~ 4 min 1.57 in HPH 
(mf take effect at 
440MW) 
2 ~ 7 min Break 
1.70 in HPH or  
0.74 in 422TA2  
• HPH drain valve 463VB21 stuck 30% 
• Setpoint for 422VA10 regulating the level in 422TA2 is 
decreasing 
• Level in 422TA2 decreases 
3 ~ 15 min 
 
 • 422KA404,the measure regulating 422VA10 goes to max 
• 100% opening, high level alarm and 1/3 protection signal 
turbine 
• 422TA2 level will increase again and 422VA11 will regulate 
• Mf causes 463VA21 drain valve to close completely, bypass 
cannot be prevented 
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• Both problems (drifting measure and drain valve) should be 
reported and will be fixed 
• Reset bypass, when FO completed 
• Safe to continue running plant 
4 ~ 25 min End 
After 441PD1 
trip 
• RO: increasing temp in 722 and 321 pump trip 




Unanticipated Scenario 1 
 
No Est.Time  Condition Probes 
1 ~ 6 min 2.78 in 422TB1 
2 ~ 9 min Break 
3.15 in 422TB1 
just before H2 
(3.3m) and VB6 
closes 
• 422VB6 closing 
• Water level 422TB1 increasing (normal level 2.5m) 
• No alarm at 2.8m  
• 422VB7 mergency valve does not open 





4 ~ 20 min End 
10 min after 321 
problem 
• Turbine trip 
• One steam line remains open. 421VA1v1 
• Generator breaker will trip at 11MW 
• Scram/maintenance/open generator breaker? 
• RO: 422VB7, sprinkling valve starts to leak into drywell, flow 
from 322PB1 increasing and pressure and temperature decrease 
in drywell 
• RO: 313pump speed increase and 321 PB1 trip 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 2 
 
No Est. Time  Condition Response 
1 ~ 5.40 min  
2 ~ 6.20 min Break 
just before high 
level alarm in 
KRA 
• Leak in KRA, increasing level in KRA building, decreasing 
level in condenser, changed position of positionen på 462VA5 
3 ~ 15 min etter VA5 
0.63 i rummet 
 
 
4 ~ 32 min End 
• RO: 313PC core cooling pump increased speed. RO should stop 
pump and report to FO 
• Leakage in KRA increasing. Crews should decide to bypass 
• The leakage will decrease but not completely: 332VB2 is  stuck 
at 4% 
• Low level alarm in condenser. 
• 462VA5 closing, level in FW tank decreasing 
• 462VB does not open and has to be controlled manually 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 3 
 
No Est. Time  Condition Response 
1 ~ 5 min 30% PB1 
 161
2 ~ 7 min Break 
10 sek. after 
pump trip. 
Before H2 
(3.3m) and VB6 
closes 
• Seawater cooling pump decreases and trips 
• 461EA1.E2. Pressure in condenser increases 
• Flow will decrease and temp increase after PB1 pump 
• Seawater temp increases from 12 to 18C in five minutes 
• Increasing temp and pressure in condenser 
• RO has to reduce power 
3 ~ 18 min  
 
 
4 ~ 30 min End 
10 min after 321 
problem 
• RO: 314 VC starts to leak 
• RO has to close 314VC6 and open VC5 
• Pressure in condenser increase further and alarms from cooling 
system begins to get activated 
• Seawater temp increases to 25C 
• Bypass valve 4221VA3v1 opens due to mf 
• Condenser pressure increasing further. 
• The reactor will automatically decrease to 73%, if not already 
done by crew 
• RO: temp of cooling system increasing 





Anticipated Scenario 1: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 positionen på 422VA6 Specific 
2 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
3 eleffekten, 613KA901 Specific 
4 flödet från 462TD1 Specific 
5 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
6 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
7 ventilläget för 462VC19 Specific 
8 nivån i 422TB1 422KB403 Global 
9 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
10 trycket i kondensorn 461KA1xx Global 
11 positionen på ventil 462VA5 Specific 
12 mavatempen efter HTFV 463KB507 Specific 
 
Anticipated Scenario 1: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 kondensatflödet 462KB301 Specific 
2 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
3 turbinvarvtalet 452KA812 Global 
4 positionen på 421VB1v1 Specific 
5 positionen på 421VB2v1 Specific 
6 temperaturen efter 422EA1 422KA504 Global 
7 temperaturen i RI 583KX501 Specific RO 
8 antalet stängda 421 ventiler Global 
9 eleffekten 613KA901 Global 
10 tempdiffen mellan 422KA504 (efter 422EA1) och 422KB504 (efter EB1) Specific 
11 läget på 462VA/B35 (Dumptrum kylning) Specific 
12 antalet i drift varande mavapumpar 463PX1 Global 
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13 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
14 trycket i reaktor tanken 211KW111 Global RO 
 
 
Anticipated Scenario 2: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 ventilläget för 462VC19 Specific 
2 flödet från 462TD1 (462KD302) Specific 
3 positionen på 422VA6 Specific 
4 nivån i 422TB1 422KB403 Global 
5 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
6 kondensatflödet till mavatanken, 462KB301 Global 
7 eleffekten  613KA901 Specific 
8 turbinens lager vibrationer 403KA7xx Global 
9 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
10 positionen på ventil 462VA5 Specific 
11 mavatempen efter HTFV 463KB507 Specific 
12 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
 
Anticipated Scenario 2: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 vattennivån i 462TD1 Specific 
2 antalet i drift varande HC-pumpar Global RO 
3 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
4 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
5 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
6 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
7 kondensatflödet till mavatanken, 462KB301 Global 
8 effekten (613KC901) Specific 
9 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
10 läget på 463VA4 Specific 
11 flödet till 341 (341KB301) Specific 
12 kondensatflödet 462KB305 Specific 
13 trycket i inneslutningen (583KC104) Specific RO 
14 trycket i kondensorn 461KA1xx Global 
 
Anticipated Scenario 3: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 flödet från 462TD1 (462KD302) Specific 
2 nivån i MÖH dränagekärl 422TA2 Specific 
3 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
4 summa mavaflöde 312KA031 Global 
5 nivån i HTFV dränagekärl 463EA2 Specific 
6 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
7 positionen på 463VA21 Specific 
8 antalet stängda 421 ventiler Global 
9 positionen på nöddräneringsventil från HTFV EA1 463VB20 Specific 
10 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
11 positionen på nöddräneringsventilen från 422TA2, 422VA11 Specific 
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12 temperaturen på mava efter HTFV, 463KB507 Global 
 
Anticipated Scenario 3: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 läget på Avsugningsventilen från 461EA1E1 441VA6 Specific 
2 havsvattentemperaturen (441KA509) Specific 
3 flödet från 462TD1 (462KD302) Specific 
4 nivån i 422TB1 422KB403 Global 
5 temperaturen efter 331EB2, EB3 (722KB503) Specific RO 
6 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
7 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
8 temperaturen på 441KX511/512 (Temp. avg. kylv. srt. 1-6) Specific 
9 temperaturen efter HTFV (463KB507) Specific 
10 trycket i reaktor tanken 211KW111 Global RO 
11 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
12 summa mavaflöde 312KA031 Global 
13 kondensatflödet till mavatanken, 462KB301 Global 
14 trycket i kondensorn (461KA105) Specific 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 1: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 nivån i 422TB1 Specific 
2 temperaturen på mava efter HTFV, 463KB507 Global 
3 nivån i mavatanken 462KB402 Global 
4 vattenflödet till 462TD1 Specific 
5 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
6 antalet stängda 421 ventiler Global 
7 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
8 flödet 341KB301? Specific 
9 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 1: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 varvtalet på turbinen, 452KA812 Specific 
2 mavaflödet 463KB305 Specific 
3 eleffekten 613KC901 Specific 
4 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
5 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
6 eleffekten 613KA901 Global 
7 positionen på 463VA4 Specific 
8 turbinens lager vibrationer 403KA7xx Global 
9 turbinvarvtalet 452KA812 Global 
10 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
11 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
12 reaktoreffekten 531KW077 Specific RO 
13 antalet stängda ventiler i 321 Global RO 




Unanticipated Scenario 2: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 vattenflödet från kondensorn Specific 
2 vattenflödet till mavatanken Specific 
3 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
4 positionen på 462VA5 Specific 
5 turbinvarvtalet 452KA812 Global 
6 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
7 antalet stängda 421 ventiler Global 
8 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
9 kondensatflödet till mavatanken, 462KB301 Global 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 2: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
2 nivån i kondensorn Specific 
3 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 Global 
4 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
5 HC flödet Specific RO 
6 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
7 antalet 721 pumpar i drift Global RO 
8 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
9 positionen på 462VA5 Specific 
10 kondensatflödet 462KB301 Specific 
11 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
12 eleffekten 613KA901 Specific 
13 nivån i mavatanken Specific 
14 temperaturen på mava efter HTFV, 463KB507 Global 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 3: After Detection Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 turbinens oljetemperatur efter lager 403KA5xx Global 
2 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 Global 
3 dränageflödet till mavatanken, 462KD302 Global 
4 temperaturen 462KA503, efter kondensatpumparna Specific 
5 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
6 341KB101, tryck före TB1 Specific 
7 antalet i drift varande 441 pumpar Specific 
8 eleffekten 613KA901 Specific 
9 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 Global 
10 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
11 flödet 341KB301 Specific 
12 antalet i drift varande mavapumpar 463PX1 Global 
 
Unanticipated Scenario 3: After Mitigation Period 
 
No Item Type 
1 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x Global 
2 dränageflödet till mavatanken, 462KD302 Global 
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3 temperaturen i RI 583KX501 Global RO 
4 turbinvarvtalet 452KA812 Global 
5 nivån i kondensorn Specific 
6 temperature efter 724 pumpar 724KB505 Specific 
7 trycket i kondensorn Specific 
8 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 Global 
9 flödet till 341, 341KB301 Global 
10 eleffekten 613KA901 Specific 
11 nivån i 463EB1 463KA402 Specific 
12 temperaturen i RI Specific RO 
13 kondensatflödet 462KB301 Specific 




1 antalet stängda 421 ventiler 
2 turbinvarvtalet 452KA812 
3 temperaturen efter 422EA1 422KA504 
4 nivån i 422TB1 422KB403 
5 turbinens lager vibrationer 403KA7xx 
6 turbinens oljetemperatur efter lager 403KA5xx 
7 trycket i kondensorn 461KA1xx 
8 nivån i kondensorn 461KA40x 
9 antalet i drift varande huvudkylvattenpumpar 441 
10 flödet till 341, 341KB301 
11 antalet i drift varande kondensatpumpar 462Px1 
12 temperaturen efter kondensatpumparna 462KA503 
13 kondensatflödet till mavatanken, 462KB301 
14 dränageflödet till mavatanken, 462KD302 
15 eleffekten 613KA901 
16 temperaturen i gemensam ledning före HTFV, 463KB501 
17 temperaturen på mava efter HTFV, 463KB507 
18 antalet i drift varande mavapumpar 463PX1 
19 summa mavaflöde 312KA031 






SACRI Sensitivity and Response Bias Formulae 
 
Formulae originally derived in Hogg et al. (1995). 
 
1-p1 p(correct acceptance): number of correct acceptances divided by total number of correct 
 acceptances and false alarms. 
 
p1 p(false alarm): number of false alarms divided by total number of correct acceptances and 
 false alarms. 
 
1-p2 p(hit): number of hits divided by total number of hits and misses. 
 
p2 p(miss): number of misses divided by total number of hits and misses. 
 
p0 p(deviation): i.e. total number of hits and misses divided by total number of questions. 
 
q0 p(non-deviations): i.e. total number of correct acceptances and false alarms divided by  
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